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The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director 
Lisa M. Fairfax 
ABSTRACT: In the wake of recent scandals and the economic meltdown, 
there is nearly universal support for the notion that corporations must have 
independent directors. Conventional wisdom insists that independent 
directors can more effectively monitor the corporation and prevent or 
otherwise better detect wrongdoing. As the movement to increase director 
independence has gained traction, inside directors have become an 
endangered species, relegated to holding a minimal number of seats on the 
corporate board. This Article questions the popular trend away from inside 
directors by critiquing the rationales in favor of director independence, and 
assessing the potential advantages of inside directors. This Article argues 
that the value of independent directors has been overstated, while the value 
of inside directors has been under-appreciated and under-examined. This 
argument rests on three critical points. First, independent directors are 
constrained in their ability to perform their monitoring functions, and many 
of these constraints may be insurmountable—particularly as we increase 
independent directors’ responsibilities. Second, inside directors can make 
valuable, and often overlooked, contributions to board governance. Third, 
reliance on independent directors as a substitute for external regulation is 
inappropriate and potentially costly. To this end, this Article suggests that 
inside directors may serve an important signaling function, underscoring 
the need for enhanced regulation, while ensuring that corporate monitors 
are subject to appropriate liability and therefore have increased incentives to 
perform their responsibilities. 
To be sure, the case for the inside director is not an easy one, particularly 
given that any benefits such directors bring to the board come with costs, 
including the potential for self-dealing and overreaching. However, before 
we render inside directors extinct, we first should determine whether their 
costs are outweighed by their benefits. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The inside director—a director currently employed with the 
corporation on whose board she serves—is a dying breed.1 Although the 
inside director once dominated corporate boards,2 today the inside director 
has been painted as biased, untrustworthy, and generally antithetical to the 
best interests of shareholders and the corporation.3 As a result, inside 
directors have been banished altogether from many board committees and 
reduced to holding a minimal number of seats on the board as a whole.4 
This virtual elimination of inside directors’ role on corporate boards is 
inextricably linked to the overwhelming consensus that boards should be 
dominated by “independent” directors.5 Such consensus stems from a belief 
that independent directors are better equipped to monitor the corporation, 
detect fraud, and protect shareholders’ interests.6 Pursuant to this majority 
view, independent directors appear to represent the perfect solution to the 
corporate-agency problem because they can oversee corporate affairs in a 
manner that prevents corporate managers from shirking their 
responsibilities or otherwise abusing their authority. As a result, reforms 
often “trumpet” the enhanced director independence as a response to 
corporate-governance failures, both prompting and requiring corporations 
to populate their boards and committees with independent directors.7 And 
 
 1. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 921 (1999) (noting that insiders hold relatively few 
seats on the boards of most large, American public companies). 
 2. See id. (“In the 1960s, most [public companies] had a majority of inside directors.”). 
 3. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 231 (2002); William B. Chandler III, On the 
Instructiveness of Insiders, Independents, and Institutional Investors, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1084 
(1999); Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 BUS. LAW. 1485, 1485 (1993). 
 4. Thus, various federal statutes ensure that inside directors do not serve on the board’s 
audit, nominating, or compensation committees. See infra Part II.B (discussing federal reforms). 
Moreover, recent studies reveal that, on average, inside directors hold no more than two seats, 
and in many cases only one seat, on corporate boards. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 921; 
SPENCER STUART, 2009 SPENCER STUART BOARD INDEX 4, available at http://content.spencer 
stuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/SSBI2009.pdf; THE KORN/FERRY INST., 34TH ANNUAL BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS STUDY 4 (2008), available at http://www.kornferryinstitute.com/files/pdf1/Board_ 
Study07_LoRez_FINAL.pdf. 
 5. See Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: 
How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1864 (2007) (noting the “near consensus” 
in the world that corporate best practices demand increased director independence); see also 
Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 921 (noting that “[m]ost commentators applaud the trend 
toward greater board independence” and identifying various groups that recommend such 
independence, including the National Association of Corporate Directors, the Business 
Roundtable, and CalPERs). As discussed in Part II.A, despite this consensus, there is no uniform 
definition of “independent.” 
 6. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 232; Chandler, supra note 3, at 1094. 
 7. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 455–58 (2008). 
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in the current economic downturn, the pressure for increased director 
independence has escalated. 
In addition to reducing agency costs, independent directors are 
thought to enable the corporation to engage in a form of self-regulation. 
Believing that they are better positioned to critically assess corporate 
conduct, regulators and courts give significant discretion to independent 
directors.8 That discretion ensures that there is rarely any substantive review 
of decisions made or sanctioned by independent directors. Hence, in 
various settings, the installation of independent directors serves as a 
substitute for external regulation, particularly with respect to “high risk” 
transactions.9 
The assumption that independent directors represent the ideal solution 
to the agency problem and an appropriate substitute for external regulation 
has negative implications for inside directors. This is because, while there is 
no clear consensus with respect to the definition of an “independent 
director,” it is clear that an inside director is excluded from that definition.10 
Legislators and governance experts presume that inside directors lack the 
impartiality necessary to appropriately monitor the corporation. Therefore, 
as corporations have embraced greater independence on their boards, the 
inside director has become almost obsolete. 
In light of this phenomenon, this Article seeks to determine what role, 
if any, insiders should play on the corporate board. Focusing primarily on 
Delaware law,11 as well as federal rules encompassed in the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 (“SOX”)12 and corresponding federal reforms, this Article 
concludes that, despite the normative appeal of the independent director, 
insiders can and should play a pivotal role on the corporate board. In fact, 
this Article reveals that the independent director’s value has been vastly 
overstated, while the inside director has been under-appreciated and under-
 
 8. See E. Norman Veasey, Should Corporation Law Inform Aspirations for Good Corporate 
Governance Practices—or Vice Versa?, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2182 (2001); see also Irwin 
Borowski, Corporate Accountability: The Role of the Independent Director, 9 J. CORP. L. 455, 457–58 
(1984) (stating that the independent director is held primarily accountable for corporate 
conduct). 
 9. See infra Part II.D. This Article uses the term “high-risk transaction” to describe those 
transactions that have a particularly high probability of managerial or director infidelity, such as 
conflict-of-interest transactions, derivative suits, or takeover transactions. 
 10. See Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 455 (noting the presumption that insider status 
precludes director independence). 
 11. This Article focuses on Delaware law because most public corporations incorporate in 
Delaware, and hence Delaware plays a prominent role in shaping corporate law. See Renee M. 
Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L. 625, 632 
(2004); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 457 (2004) (referring to 
Delaware as the “mother” of all corporation law). 
 12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.). 
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examined. This revelation has important implications for corporate 
governance and our system of external regulation. 
This revelation rests on three premises. First, there exist significant 
limitations on independent directors’ ability to fulfill their monitoring role, 
and it is very difficult to overcome those limitations, especially as 
independent directors’ responsibilities increase. While others have 
recognized the defects associated with independent directors’ ability to 
perform their monitoring function, most nevertheless contend that those 
defects can be mitigated. This Article questions the legitimacy of that 
contention, while further amplifying the reasons why independent directors 
may prove ineffective. 
Second, insiders can add value to the corporate board because they 
have the information, knowledge, and resources that not only increase 
corporate performance, but also may enable them to more accurately 
monitor and police the actions of other insiders. Importantly, this Article 
demonstrates that the line between insider status and independent status is 
significantly blurry, at least as it relates to potentially compromising ties, 
undermining the notion that insiders should be viewed as categorically 
incapable of behaving in an objective fashion. 
Third, this Article highlights the flawed reliance upon independent 
directors as substitutes for external regulation. Particularly with respect to 
high-risk transactions, there is little reason to trust either inside or outside 
directors to make appropriate decisions, and hence our regulatory regime 
has inappropriately favored the independent director. In this regard, it may 
be that embracing insiders on the board could serve an important signaling 
function, decreasing courts’ willingness to defer to any director in the 
context of high-risk transactions. This could prompt a corresponding 
increase in the likelihood that corporate misconduct can be appropriately 
analyzed, regulated, and sanctioned. Moreover, it may increase the deterrent 
function of external regulation.13 
Part II of this Article reveals the manner in which the corporate 
landscape has shifted to exclude inside directors from the board, and the 
rationale for that shift. Part III pinpoints the limits of independent directors’ 
ability to be truly independent and to effectively perform their monitoring 
role, while highlighting the difficulties associated with overcoming those 
limitations. This Part also examines the empirical evidence on independent 
directors’ impact. Part IV makes the affirmative case for the inside director 
and then analyzes the principal drawbacks associated with reliance on such 
 
 13. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?: Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty 
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 438–39 (2005) (noting that, under the existing 
regulatory regime, legal sanctions have very little deterrent value because of the relatively low 
risk that directors will be subjected to such sanctions); see also Hillary A. Sale, Independent 
Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 1379 (2006) (pinpointing the dearth of SEC 
actions against independent directors).  
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directors. In particular, this Part grapples with the limits of inside directors’ 
role in the context of self-dealing transactions and fraud detection, while 
emphasizing that those limitations may not be overcome through reliance 
on independent directors. This Part also wrestles with the difficulties of 
relying on insiders who are subordinates and hence may find it difficult to 
objectively critique their superiors or otherwise challenge their superiors’ 
decisions. Part V offers some concluding thoughts. 
II. THE VIRTUAL DISAPPEARANCE OF THE INSIDE DIRECTOR 
This Part demonstrates how inside directors essentially have been 
replaced with outside, so-called “independent,” directors. Before engaging 
in such demonstration, Subpart A better defines the term “inside director.” 
Subpart B pinpoints the manner in which independent directors have 
displaced inside directors, while Subparts C and D explain the rationales for 
such displacement. 
A. DEFINING INDEPENDENCE: INSIDERS VS. THE WORLD 
Despite its prominence in corporate and securities law, the term 
“independent director” has no uniform definition; instead judges and 
legislators define the term differently.14 Moreover, the term is used 
differently in various contexts.15 
Notwithstanding these differences, however, all definitions are uniform 
in their exclusion of “inside directors”—directors who are currently 
employed by the corporation on whose board they serve.16 At the federal 
level, SOX and various federal listing standards define an independent 
director by reference to a bright-line test that excludes inside directors. For 
example, under New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) and NASDAQ Stock 
Market (“NASDAQ”) rules, no director can qualify as independent if she has 
 
 14. See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 78 
(2007); see also Victor Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 597, 598–99 (1982) (noting that the concept of director independence “does 
not carry a clear meaning for many of its proponents or the same meaning for all of its 
proponents”). 
 15. See Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 466–67 (noting the distinction between independence 
with respect to federal law and Delaware law); see also Clarke, supra note 14, at 78 (noting that 
jurisdictions use different terms to define directors who may be deemed independent, and that 
those terms describe different roles). 
 16. See Clarke, supra note 14, at 79 (adopting the term “non-management” director 
because it captures the one element common to all definitions—that the so-called independent 
director is not a member of the company’s management team); see also Jill E. Fisch, Taking 
Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 279 (1997) (arguing that, by labeling employees 
“insiders” and non-employees “independent,” many studies use a superficial criteria to 
distinguish between independent and inside directors). 
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a material relationship with the company.17 The first such disqualifying 
material relationship is serving as an employee of the company.18 Similarly, 
SOX automatically excludes from the definition of “independent” any 
director who receives direct compensation from the company on whose 
board she sits.19 In this regard, an “inside director” is distinguished from an 
“outside director” who does not have an employment position with the 
company. Being an outside director is a prerequisite for being considered 
independent under these categorical rules.20 
In contrast to this bright-line test for independence at the federal level, 
Delaware courts define “independence” contextually.21 As an initial matter, 
Delaware courts distinguish between a “disinterested director” and an 
“independent director.” A disinterested director is a director who will not 
benefit financially from a transaction other than a benefit enjoyed by 
shareholders more generally.22 Hence, disinterest is narrower than 
independence. Moreover, a director’s disinterest is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition for independence.23 Thus, in addition to 
demonstrating that a director is disinterested, proving independence 
requires showing that a director has no ties to a particular interested 
individual and is not otherwise controlled by that individual in a manner 
that compromises her ability to make objective decisions with respect to the 
 
 17. See NYSE, Listed Company Manual § 303A.08 (2010), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/ 
LCM/Sections/; NASDAQ, Marketplace Rules r. 4200(a)(15) (2004), available at www.nasdaq. 
com/about/MarketplaceRules.pdf. 
 18. See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.02(b)(i); NASDAQ, supra note 17, at r. 4200(a)(15). 
Directors also cannot be deemed independent if one of their immediate family members is 
employed by the corporation. See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.02(b)(i); NASDAQ, supra note 
17, at r. 4200(a)(15). 
 19. To qualify as “independent,” the director cannot accept any “consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fee” from the issuer or any of its subsidiaries, other than in his or her 
capacity as a board member. See 15 U.S.C. § 78-1(m)(3)(B) (2006). 
 20. Thus, independence is not synonymous with outsider status but rather encompasses 
that status. See Clarke, supra note 14, at 99–100. This Article therefore uses the term 
“independent director” to encompass outside directors. Interestingly, despite the prohibition 
on inside directors, a person who is a former employee of the corporation can be deemed an 
outside and independent director. Thus, under the NYSE and NASDAQ rules, a director could 
be deemed independent three years after the end of her employment relationship with the 
corporation. See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.02(b); NASDAQ, supra note 17, at r. 4200(a)(15). 
Indeed, it is often the case that former executives serve on their corporation’s board. 
 21. This is due primarily to the fact that Delaware courts define “independence” with 
respect to specific transactions. See Clarke, supra note 14, at 102. 
 22. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that a director is 
interested in a transaction when she expects to derive a personal financial benefit from the 
transaction that does not devolve upon the corporation or stockholders more generally). 
 23. See Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 466 (noting that interest can be viewed as a 
“subspecies—perhaps the most archetypal example—of independence”). 
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individual.24 Delaware’s situational approach to independence means that a 
director’s independence cannot be determined ex ante; instead a director’s 
independence can be determined only after examining the specific 
transaction at issue and the directors or officers impacted by the 
transaction.25 
Like the definition of “independence” at the federal level, Delaware 
courts inevitably have concluded that inside directors cannot be 
independent. This is because even when such directors are not interested 
because they do not have financial ties to the underlying transaction, courts 
presume that their managerial position within the company undermines 
their ability to make objective decisions with regard to other officers or 
directors.26 Hence, inside directors are not viewed as independent even 
under Delaware’s more nuanced assessment of director independence. 
As this analysis reveals, while there may be differences with respect to 
the manner in which courts and regulators define independence, the 
common thread running through all of these definitions is the notion that 
insider status disqualifies a director from being independent.27 In this 
regard, a director’s insider status appears to both distinguish her and set her 
apart from all other directors. 
B. THE CONVERGENCE TOWARD INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
Historically, inside directors played a dominant role on corporate 
boards, holding most of the seats.28 While their numbers gradually declined 
from the 1930s to the 1950s, inside directors still held some 50% of board 
seats.29 Moreover, as recently as 1989, it was rare for a board to have fewer 
than three inside directors.30 
In recent years, insiders’ early dominance has diminished completely. 
By the 1990s, independent directors began holding an increasingly larger 
portion of corporate board seats.31 The most recent Korn/Ferry study on 
 
 24. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 362 (Del. 1993); see also Aronson, 
473 A.2d at 812 (stating that a disinterested director can neither anticipate a personal gain nor 
be involved on more than one side of a transaction). 
 25. Veasey, supra note 8, at 2180–82; see Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 466. 
 26. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1044 (Del. 2004) (presuming the lack of independence of an inside director who also served as 
vice president). 
 27. See Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 465 (noting the “blanket assumption that outsider 
status—that is, lack of financial or familial ties to the company—is the best indicator for 
independence”). 
 28. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 921. 
 29. See Kenneth Lehn et al., Determinants of the Size and Structure of Corporate Boards: 
1935–2000 (Nov. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=470675. 
 30. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1476 (2007). 
 31. See id. at 1565. 
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corporate boards found that, on average, 80% of directors are 
independent.32 This figure has remained unchanged for at least a decade.33 
Then too, by 2004, 91% of companies had boards with two or fewer 
insiders.34 In 2009, half of S&P 500 companies had only one inside director, 
the CEO.35 Hence, the typical corporation has a supermajority of 
independent directors with a corresponding minimal number of inside 
directors.36 These statistics reveal that board composition has undergone a 
virtual sea change over the past several decades. 
In recent years, this change has been accelerated by federal legislation. 
SOX essentially requires that a board have an audit committee, and that the 
audit committee be comprised entirely of independent directors.37 SOX also 
requires each national securities exchange and national securities 
association to adopt rules compatible with SOX.38 Pursuant to this 
requirement, listing agencies such as the NYSE and NASDAQ not only 
adopted rules requiring each member of the audit committee to be 
independent, but also mandated that each member of the nominating and 
compensation committee be independent.39 Finally, the NYSE and 
NASDAQ require their listed companies to have a majority of independent 
directors on their boards.40 Federal rules passed in the wake of the recent 
financial meltdown also incorporate director-independence provisions. For 
example, the most recent financial-reform bill requires compensation 
committee members to be independent.41 Federal rules already required 
 
 32. THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 4 (noting that on average, only two out of ten 
directors are full-time employees). In 2009, 82% of S&P 500 directors were independent, up 
from 78% in 1999. SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 8. 
 33. See KORN/FERRY INT’L, 31ST ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 11 (2004) 
(revealing that the average number of outside directors on the corporate board has remained 
constant since 1990). A Spencer Stuart study reveals that over the past ten years there has been 
a 5% increase in independent directors at S&P 500 companies. SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, 
at 8. 
 34. Gordon, supra note 30, at 1476; see KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 33, at 10; cf. Bhagat 
& Black, supra note 3, at 239 (explaining the decrease in inside directors from 1970 to 1997). 
 35. SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 4. 
 36. See KORN/FERRY INT’L, supra note 33, at 10. 
 37. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (2006). 
 38. See id. § 78j-l(m)(1)(A). 
 39. See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.06 (audit committee); id. § 303A.05 (compensation 
committee); id. § 303A.04 (nominating committee); NASDAQ, supra note 17, at r. 4350(d) 
(audit committee); id. at r. 4350(c) (compensation and nominating committees); see also NYSE 
Amex, Company Guide § 803 (2010), http://wallstreet.cch.com/AMEX/CompanyGuide/ 
(audit committee); id. § 804 (requiring all nominating committee members to be 
independent); id. § 805 (requiring all compensation committee members to be independent). 
 40. See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.08; NASDAQ, supra note 17, at rr. 4200(a)(15), 
4350(c); see also NYSE Amex, supra note 39, § 802 (stating that the majority of directors on a 
board must be independent). 
 41. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78j-3). 
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that the compensation committees of companies receiving funding pursuant 
to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) be comprised of 
independent directors.42 By mandating the presence of independent 
directors, these rules hastened the shift away from inside directors.43 
However, even before the enactment of SOX, corporate-governance 
norms had been trending away from inside directors. Indeed by the 1990s, 
most corporate-governance bodies had come to embrace the view that 
independent directors should dominate corporate boards.44 Reflecting this 
embrace, as of 2001, some 75% of companies listed on the NYSE or 
NASDAQ had a majority of independent directors.45 A 2000 study similarly 
revealed that independent directors had begun to hold a majority of seats 
on many board committees.46 As a result, by the time of SOX’s enactment, 
most public corporations had displaced their inside directors in favor of 
independent directors. 
C. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AS A CURE FOR THE CORPORATE-AGENCY PROBLEM 
The shift away from the inside director is prompted by the belief that 
independent directors are better monitors than inside directors and hence 
represent the perfect response to the corporate-agency problem. In the 
corporation, shareholders (or those perceived to “own” the corporation) are 
distinct from directors and officers (or those charged with managing the 
 
 42. See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 31 C.F.R. pt. 30 
(2009). 
 43. Other rules also encouraged a shift towards greater director independence. Under the 
Internal Revenue Code, for example, compensation committee members must qualify as 
outside directors in order to preserve the deductibility of certain compensation paid to 
executive officers. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(i) (1995). 
 44. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 232–33 (noting an agreement by groups including 
the Council of Institutional Investors, Business Roundtable, Conference Board, and American 
Law Institute that corporations should populate their boards with independent directors). 
 45. See Press Release, Investor Responsibility Res. Ctr., IRCC Data Guides New Listing 
Rules for NYSE (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/IRRC+Data+ 
Guides+New+Listing+Rules+for+NYSE.-a087473214; see also Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 
921 (noting that most public companies had a majority of independent directors as of 1997); 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards 21 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law 
& Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 159, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=801308 (noting that by the early 1970s, outside directors constituted the majority at 
most public companies). 
 46. A 2000 study indicated that 90% of directors on compensation committees were 
independent, while 64% of boards were comprised of audit committees with completely 
independent directors. See Press Release, Investor Responsibility Res. Ctr., IRRC Releases 2000 
Board Practices Report (Dec. 1, 2000), available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/IRRC+ 
Releases+2000+Board+Practices+Report-a067495393. Similarly, Spencer Stuart data reveals 
that, in 1999, 93% of directors on the audit committee were independent, while 95% of 
directors on the compensation committee were independent and 69% of directors on the 
nominating committee were independent. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 9. 
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corporation).47 The separation of ownership and control in the corporation 
means that while corporate officers have tremendous discretion to make 
decisions, there exist few mechanisms to hold them accountable for those 
decisions and hence to ensure that they use their discretion in a manner 
that benefits the corporation and its shareholders.48 Importantly, there is 
nothing to prevent corporate officers from self-dealing—that is, engaging in 
transactions that benefit themselves at the expense of the corporation.49 
Therefore, corporate law’s perpetual challenge has been to develop 
mechanisms that can reduce agency costs.50 
The principle corporate-governance response to the agency problem 
has been the independent director.51 The independent director’s primary 
function is to monitor the corporation and its officers with an eye towards 
ensuring that managers do not abuse their authority by engaging in self-
dealing or fraud, or otherwise shirking their responsibilities.52 Independent 
directors’ monitoring role encompasses several functions. Such directors 
guard against self-dealing by closely examining conflict-of-interest 
transactions to ensure that they benefit the corporation.53 Independent 
directors also are supposed to detect and prevent fraud because their active 
oversight decreases managers’ ability to engage in wrongdoing.54 In 
addition, such directors should prevent managerial shirking and thus 
enhance corporate performance because they can proactively examine 
corporate affairs, not only to ensure that managers are productive, but also 
to ensure that managers make the most efficient and effective decisions. 
Thus, independent directors’ monitoring role should enhance 
performance throughout the corporation. In the audit committee, for 
example, their presence should ensure that managers deliver unbiased 
accounting information to shareholders and other stakeholders. In the 
 
 47. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 84–89 (1932); William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 
26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001); Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20th-
Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005). But see Theresa A. 
Gabaldon, Like a Fish Needs a Bicycle: Public Corporations and Their Shareholders, 65 MD. L. REV. 
538, 538 (2006) (noting that the notion of shareholders as owners is a myth). 
 48. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 47; Bratton, supra note 47, at 755–58. 
 49. See Bratton, supra note 47, at 760. 
 50. See Michael C. Jensen & William Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, in FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 7, 7 (Roberta 
Romano ed., 1993). 
 51. See Clarke, supra note 14, at 81. 
 52. See James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interests: Empowering the Outside 
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2003); Mitchell, supra note 45, at 
33–34 (noting endorsement of the monitoring model of the corporate board). 
 53. Cox, supra note 52, at 1079–80. 
 54. This fraud-detection role includes independent directors’ role as securities monitor, 
pursuant to which such directors assess the adequacy and accuracy of corporate disclosures. See 
Sale, supra note 13, at 1380–88. 
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compensation committee, their presence should ensure that compensation 
structures are aligned in a way that encourages managers to focus on the 
interests of shareholders and the corporation. Independent directors also 
should promote transparent and accurate disclosures because their 
oversight should prevent managers from withholding or otherwise distorting 
information.55 In these ways, independent directors’ monitoring roles help 
align managerial authority with corporate interests and encourage 
responsible decision making. 
Importantly, it is believed that in order for directors to perform this 
monitoring function effectively, directors must be independent from 
management and the corporation. Their independence ensures that 
directors do not feel beholden to managers and hence can monitor them 
without unwarranted influences. In other words, a director’s independence 
means that she can be trusted to critically examine decisions made by 
officers, as opposed to simply rubber-stamping those decisions. 
Conventional wisdom dictates that inside directors cannot be 
characterized as independent directors because they are inherently partial 
to corporate managers and other directors. Inside directors are presumed to 
lack independence because they are employed and compensated by the 
company, and thus their concern for retaining their jobs will ensure that 
they cannot be objective.56 Inside directors also are presumed to lack 
independence because their position as insiders and managers means they 
cannot be trusted to act objectively with respect to decisions made by other 
managers. This is especially true for insiders who are subordinate to the 
CEO and therefore, presumably, would feel uncomfortable making 
decisions negatively impacting the CEO or otherwise sharply criticizing the 
CEO’s policies and practices. Furthermore, the CEO’s historical role as 
chairman of the board prevented insiders from being viewed as unbiased 
monitors. Anecdotal evidence appears to support this proposition, revealing 
the propensity of inside directors to acquiesce in managerial misconduct.57 
Given these limitations, the independent director was viewed as the perfect 
counter to inside directors.58 
Relying on these understandings, corporate-governance reforms 
typically focused on increasing director independence on corporate boards. 
Indeed, corporate wrongdoing is often viewed as a failure of the corporate 
monitoring system. Over the past few decades, a belief emerged that the 
independent director could rectify this failure and serve as a check on 
 
 55. See id. 
 56. See Michael Abramowicz & M. Todd Henderson, Prediction Markets for Corporate 
Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1370 (2007) (noting that employees can be 
especially risk-averse about losing their job, and this concern may cause them to acquiesce or 
participate in corporate misconduct). 
 57. See Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 456. 
 58. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 457–59. 
A3 - FAIRFAX.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  2:13 PM 
140 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:127 
managerial abuses of authority. Thus, widespread corporate misconduct in 
the 1970s prompted corporate-governance experts to insist upon greater 
independence for corporate directors.59 Corporate malfeasance in the 
1980s renewed the push for director independence.60 
Interestingly, each corporate-governance scandal not only highlighted 
the need for enhanced managerial accountability, but also illuminated the 
flaws associated with the manner in which “independence” was defined.61 
Thus, each wave of corporate reforms focused not only on increasing the 
number of independent directors on the board, but also on tightening the 
standards for measuring independence. SOX’s corporate-governance 
reforms both mirrored and extended these trends, centering on increasing 
the number of independent directors on the board and certain critical 
committees, as well as tightening the criteria for determining director 
independence.62 More recent federal reforms follow this same pattern.63 
Collectively, these reforms embrace the view that independent directors 
represent an ideal solution to the corporate-agency conundrum, helping to 
reduce corporate malfeasance and enhance corporate performance. 
The growing consensus that independent directors represent the ideal 
check on managerial misconduct has negative implications for the inside 
director. Because the independent director is by definition an outside 
director, this consensus necessitates a corresponding decline in, if not 
elimination of, the role and presence of inside directors. 
D. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS AS SUBSTITUTE FOR EXTERNAL REGULATION 
Courts and regulators historically have embraced the view that they are 
not in the best position to judge the conduct of corporate officers and 
directors for at least two reasons. The first is that they are not businesspeople 
and hence are ill-equipped to judge business decisions.64 Indeed, given the 
 
 59. See id. at 455–56 (noting the role of former SEC Chairman Harold Williams in 
advocating for increased director independence as a response to the corporate-accountability 
problem); Brudney, supra note 14, at 597–98. 
 60. See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: 
Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898, 899–900 (1996). 
 61. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 458–60 (discussing defaults related to the concept of an 
independent director and proposed reforms). 
 62. See Elizabeth Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform: Independence or 
Democracy?, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1, 5–6. 
 63. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78j-3). 
 64. This notion is perhaps best exemplified in the 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 
N.W. 668, 684–85 (Mich. 1919), in which the court refused to interfere with the Ford Motor 
Company’s proposed business expansion on the premise that judges are not business experts 
and hence were not in the best position to determine the future impact of that expansion. See 
also Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (noting that courts are ill-equipped to 
judge ex post the appropriateness of business decisions (citing Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 
327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997))); Clarke, supra note 14, at 79–80. 
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inherent risk associated with business decisions, judges’ ex post analysis of 
those decisions may discourage directors from engaging in appropriate, 
though risky, behavior.65 Moreover, courts should preference the decisions 
of directors because such directors (and not judges) were elected by 
shareholders to govern.66 The second reason courts and regulators have 
been reluctant to intervene in business decisions is that they cannot be 
proactive in monitoring corporate decisions—at best they serve as an ex post 
check on board behavior.67 This reluctance is exemplified by the standard 
pursuant to which courts review most corporate conduct. This standard, 
known as the “business judgment rule,” presumes that directors’ decisions 
are made in the best interests of the corporation and requires shareholders 
to overcome a tremendous hurdle in order to hold directors liable for such 
decisions.68 Importantly, however, courts and regulators recognize that the 
deference afforded corporate decisions is only appropriate if they can be 
assured that those decisions will be made free from inappropriate 
influences. 
1. Independent Directors and Ordinary Business Decisions 
The independent director is seemingly the perfect solution to this 
quandary. Not only are they better suited to judge the actions of corporate 
managers, but also they can be proactive in a manner that courts cannot. 
Then too, courts and regulators believe that independent directors are the 
most appropriate arbiters of corporate conduct because they have been 
chosen by shareholders and thus have the requisite authority to make 
decisions on behalf of the shareholders.69 Most importantly, directors’ 
independence ensures that they will impartially assess the actions of the 
corporation. Hence, independent directors are viewed as superior to, and an 
ideal substitute for, external regulators.70 As one governance expert notes, 
the focus on independent directors decreases “the need for government to 
 
 65. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 323, 341, 352–57 (2007) (questioning the effectiveness of liability and proposing a 
system of rewards to promote effective capital gatekeeping); Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and 
the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 831 (2004). 
 66. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 832–33. 
 67. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 457–58. 
 68. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). Given the extreme deference 
afforded to directors under the business judgment rule, some have referred to the rule as a 
policy of non-review. See Williams T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 870 (2001); Lyman Johnson, The 
Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625, 625 (2000). 
 69. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 832–33. 
 70. See Clarke, supra note 14, at 79–80. 
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play a significant role in the area of [corporate] accountability.”71 Instead, 
that role has been ceded to the independent director. 
Courts and legislatures defer to decisions made by independent 
directors not just with respect to ordinary transactions, but also with respect 
to transactions that pose particular risks of managerial abuse.72 This 
deference is reflected in at least two areas discussed below: conflict-of-
interest transactions and shareholder derivative actions.73 
2. Independent Directors and Conflict-of-Interest Transactions 
A conflict-of-interest transaction is a transaction pursuant to which a 
director or officer receives a benefit that is not shared equally with others in 
the corporation.74 Courts recognize that these transactions are inherently 
risky because a corporate actor “cannot be expected to exercise his or her 
independent business judgment without being influenced by the . . . 
personal consequences resulting from the decision.”75 Given the risk of self-
dealing associated with such transactions, conflict-of-interest transactions 
historically were voidable by the shareholder.76 Recognizing, however, that 
these transactions may benefit the corporation, courts abandoned this 
voidability rule in favor of one requiring a heightened standard of review.77 
That review, known as the “entire fairness” test, encompasses a requirement 
that such transactions be fair to the corporation.78 Such a standard is 
decidedly more rigorous, and hence less deferential, than the business 
 
 71. Borowski, supra note 8, at 455; see also Mitchell, supra note 45, at 58 (pointing out that 
independent directors enable courts to ignore reviewing the substance of corporate decisions). 
 72. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The 
Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1345 (2005); see also Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1034, 1043–44 (1993) (noting that the manner in which courts review derivative actions 
should result in greater insulation of board decisions from judicial intervention). 
 73. This deference also can be seen in the corporate-takeover context. See Mitchell, supra 
note 45, at 58 (noting the “sanitizing effect” of independent directors in the takeover context); 
see also Borowski, supra note 8, at 467–69 (stating that courts generally do not apply the business 
judgment rule to situations involving conflicts of interest). 
 74. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1049 (Del. 2004) (noting that a person’s interest is shown by demonstrating the receipt of a 
personal benefit); Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del. 1993); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 
457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) (stating that a conflict results from appearance on both sides of 
a transaction). 
 75. Rales, 634 A.2d at 936; see also Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 663 
(Del. 1952) (noting that we cannot presume that directors will be competent decision makers 
when decisions come at their own personal expense). 
 76. See Cox, supra note 52, at 1079. 
 77. See id.; Velasco, supra note 65, at 837. 
 78. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 n.9 (Del. 1994) 
(stating that, when self-interest is present, courts will apply exacting scrutiny); Weinberger, 457 
A.2d at 710 (requiring a demonstration of utmost good faith and the most scrupulous 
bargaining). 
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judgment rule.79 However, if the transaction is approved by independent 
directors, courts reinstate review under the business judgment rule, thereby 
abandoning the more heightened standard of the entire fairness test.80 
Independent directors therefore enable courts to afford substantial 
deference to self-dealing transactions, despite the risk of misconduct such 
transactions present.81 
3. Independent Directors and Shareholder Derivative Actions 
Courts similarly defer to independent directors in the context of 
shareholder derivative actions. A shareholder derivative action refers to an 
action brought by the shareholder in the name of the corporation.82 
Shareholders must bring a derivative action against directors and officers in 
order to hold them liable for breaching their fiduciary duties.83 
Independent directors play a prominent role in these suits. 
First, independent directors play a critical role in preventing 
shareholders from even bringing a derivative action before the court. Before 
shareholders can bring a derivative action, they must make demand on the 
board or demonstrate demand futility.84 Shareholders show demand futility 
by referencing Aronson v. Lewis, which requires that they raise a reasonable 
doubt either that (1) a majority of the board upon whom shareholders 
would have made a demand lacked independence, or (2) the transaction 
was not a valid exercise of the business judgment rule.85 Given the deference 
afforded directors under the business judgment rule, establishing demand 
futility under the second prong is particularly difficult. Consequently, if the 
directors on whom demand is made are independent, it is difficult to 
demonstrate demand futility. In this way, the presence of independent 
directors reduces shareholders’ ability to avoid making a demand. When 
shareholders make a demand, such demand gives the board an opportunity 
 
 79. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 835. 
 80. See Cox, supra note 52, at 1080. In Delaware, this change is essentially codified by 
statute. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2006).  
 81. See Clarke, supra note 14, at 80 (“[E]ven the apparently fundamental and 
unobjectionable idea that transactions between a corporation and a director should be on 
terms that are fair to the corporation is not imposed on corporations . . . if the corporation’s 
board has disinterested directors . . . .”). 
 82. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative 
Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 286 (1986); 
Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of Professors Fischel and 
Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 339–40 (1986); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights 
and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349–50 
(1993).  
 83. See Fischel & Bradley, supra note 82, at 286; Schwartz, supra note 82, at 339–40; 
Swanson, supra note 82, at 1349–50. 
 84. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 807–08 (Del. 1984). 
 85. See id. at 814. 
A3 - FAIRFAX.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  2:13 PM 
144 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:127 
to resolve shareholder claims without resorting to the courts.86 Hence, the 
demand process encourages self-regulation and the use of intracorporate 
remedies.87 Because that process relies on independent directors, it 
highlights the manner in which such directors are used as a substitute for 
external regulation. Moreover, it highlights the manner in which 
independent directors serve to ensure that shareholder derivative actions, 
including those that may have some merit, do not get their day in court. 
The second way in which independent directors play a pivotal role in 
shareholder derivative actions is much similar to the first, but in a different 
context. Thus, in the demand-required context, courts continue to give 
substantial deference to independent directors’ decisions to terminate 
derivative actions, even when such directors are named as potential 
defendants.88 On the one hand, after shareholders make demand, 
independent directors can choose to terminate their action altogether.89 
Courts will not disturb the board’s termination decision unless it is deemed 
wrongful.90 On the other hand, even if demand is excused as futile under 
Aronson, independent directors can dismiss the action. Indeed, the 
interested board has the freedom to establish a committee of independent 
directors, and such committee similarly has authority to terminate a 
shareholder lawsuit.91 Courts review the committee’s termination decision 
under Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, which has two prongs: the first focuses on 
whether the committee was independent and acted in good faith, while the 
second allows the court to make its own determination regarding whether 
the action should be dismissed.92 While Zapata enables courts to review the 
termination decision on its merits, courts generally defer to the committee’s 
decision.93 
As this discussion reveals, whether demand is made or excused, 
independent directors have tremendous power over the fate of a 
shareholder’s derivative action. That power underscores the extent to which 
courts rely on such directors to supplant their own regulation. To be sure, 
courts traditionally defer to board decisions. However, such deferral is 
arguably not warranted in the context of shareholder suits alleging 
 
 86. See id. at 812 (noting that the demand requirement is aimed at ensuring that 
shareholders exhaust intracorporate remedies, thereby providing an alternative dispute 
mechanism, while adhering to the “fundamental precept that directors manage the business 
and affairs of corporations”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. at 815 (noting that the mere threat of personal liability stemming from being 
named in a complaint for approving a transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to rebut a 
director’s independence). 
 89. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981). 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 788. 
 92. See id. at 788–89. 
 93. See id. at 784.  
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misconduct by the board. Indeed, the derivative suit represents the primary 
mechanism pursuant to which shareholders can challenge corporate 
decisions and seek to hold officers and directors accountable for those 
decisions.94 By giving independent directors the power to control, and even 
terminate, derivative suits, courts have ensured that independent directors 
control the corporate-accountability process. Moreover, by deferring to the 
decisions of independent directors in this area, courts basically have 
abdicated any role they may have played in the accountability process.95 
Independent directors play a critical role in the corporate-governance 
landscape. That role is premised on the belief that such directors reduce 
agency costs by effectively and efficiently monitoring the corporation. It is 
also premised on the belief that such directors are preferable to external 
regulation, even with respect to transactions that involve a high risk of 
managerial malfeasance. Because independent directors must be outside 
directors, the increased reliance on, and deference to, such directors has 
corresponded with a reduction in the role of inside directors. Therefore, 
before establishing the case for inside directors, the next Part will examine 
the appropriateness of the reliance on, and deference afforded to, 
independent directors. 
III. THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE 
Independent directors face several obstacles that impede their ability to 
be effective monitors of the corporation. This Part highlights those 
obstacles, and in contrast to many experts, takes serious issue with the 
contention that they can be overcome. 
A. THE INTRACTABILITY OF COMPROMISING TIES: SOCIAL BONDS, 
STRUCTURAL BIAS, AND FINANCIAL REWARDS 
Conventional wisdom suggests that in order for directors to be effective 
monitors, they must be free from all compromising ties to the corporation. 
In fact, prior scandals have revealed that even directors considered 
independent because they lacked employment relationships with a 
corporation nevertheless received advisory or similar fees from the 
corporation, or otherwise had significant relationships with the corporation 
or its board that jeopardized their ability to be impartial.96 As a result, 
 
 94. See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1046 (noting that, for many corporate-governance 
experts, shareholder litigation represents “the [primary means] of enforcing management 
accountability”); Borowski, supra note 8, at 464–65; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, 
The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 261, 264–65 (1981). 
 95. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 465. 
 96. See RICHARD C. BREEDEN, RESTORING TRUST: REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF MCI, INC. 817–18 (2003), available at http:// 
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reform efforts have focused on eliminating those relationships and thereby 
strengthening the definition of “director independence.” Notwithstanding 
those efforts, the current conception of director independence continues to 
fall short of capturing all of the ties that compromise a director’s ability to 
be objective. This Part indicates that this failure may be impossible to rectify 
in a manner that enhances directors’ ability to be truly impartial. 
1. Social Ties 
All of the recent reforms define “independence” with reference to the 
financial ties between a director and the corporation. Thus, SOX excludes 
from the definition of “independent director” anyone who receives 
compensation from the corporation.97 Along these same lines, the NYSE 
and NASDAQ’s definition of independence essentially filters out 
compromising financial relationships between the corporation and the 
director.98 New financial reforms also focus on financial ties, determining 
independence by reference to the source of a person’s compensation.99 
Then too, while Delaware’s independence definition appears to capture 
more than just financial relationships, Delaware courts historically have 
defined independence in a manner that fails to give significant weight to 
anything but financial ties.100 
By contrast, the current definition of director independence does not 
in any meaningful manner encompass social or professional ties between 
directors and the corporation. Outside of familial ties, federal rules do not 
 
www.concernedshareholders.com/CCS_MCI_BreedenReport.pdf (detailing financial and other 
ties among board members and managers that impeded their ability to be effective monitors). 
 97. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B) (2006). 
 98. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ exclude from the definition of independent any director 
who receives compensation from the corporation other than her director fees. Thus, NYSE 
rules exclude from the independence definition anyone who received, during any twelve-month 
period within the last three years, more than $120,000 in direct compensation (other than 
compensation related to director service). See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.02(b)(ii). NASDAQ 
rules also exclude directors who receive any non-fee-related compensation in excess of $60,000 
during the past three fiscal years. See NASDAQ, supra note 17, at r. 4200(a)(15)(B). The listing 
agencies also exclude from the independence definition a director who has ties to any entity 
that gives to, or receives funds from, the corporation on whose board the director sits. Thus, the 
NYSE rules also exclude any director that is employed with a company that has made payments 
to or received payments from the corporation in any of the last three fiscal years that exceeds 
the greater of $1,000,000 or 2% of such company’s consolidated gross revenue. See NYSE, supra 
note 17, § 303A.02(b)(v). NASDAQ has a similar rule that excludes from the definition of 
independent any director that is currently a partner, controlling shareholder, or executive 
officer of a company that receives or has received payments from the corporation on whose 
board the director sits in excess of the greater of 5% of the receiving company’s gross revenues 
or $200,000. See NASDAQ, supra note 17, at r. 4200(a)(15)(D).  
 99. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 78j-3). 
 100. See infra notes 102, 104 (explaining courts’ traditional reluctance to consider social 
ties). 
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consider social or professional connections in the independence inquiry.101 
Similarly, Delaware courts essentially have dismissed allegations of social ties 
from the independence analysis. To be sure, on the heels of the 2002 
corporate-governance scandals, it appeared that Delaware courts would 
allow social ties to play a significant role in the independence inquiry.102 
Thus, two lower Delaware court cases affirmatively recognized the impact 
that social and professional ties could play in a director’s ability to be 
independent.103 In so doing, Delaware courts acknowledged that such 
recognition represented a departure from earlier cases that failed to 
consider the compromising nature of social relationships.104 However, 
recent decisions have retreated from this recognition, making clear that a 
director’s social or professional relationships would play a minimal role in 
the independence inquiry.105 That role means that in most cases such ties 
would not impact the independence analysis.106 To this end, the Delaware 
Supreme Court emphasized that evidence regarding social, professional, or 
business relationships would normally be insufficient to discredit a director’s 
independence.107 As a result, even lengthy friendships or professional 
 
 101. Federal rules define independence to exclude other problematic relationships. Thus, 
a director will not fit the definition of independent if she is (or within the last three years has 
been) an executive officer at a company during the time when the corporation’s current 
executive officers served on such company’s compensation committee. See NYSE, supra note 17, 
§ 303A.02(b)(iv). The rules also exclude people who have certain affiliations with the 
company’s auditors. See id. § 303A.02(b)(iii). Neither of these relationships, however, 
affirmatively encompasses purely social or professional connections. 
 102. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Sarbanes-Oxley, Corporate Federalism, and the Declining Significance of 
Federal Reforms on State Director Independence Standards, 31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 381, 399–403 
(2005) (discussing the Oracle and Beam cases in the context of Delaware courts’ willingness to 
consider social and professional ties in the independence inquiry). 
 103. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 979–
82 (Del. Ch. 2003) (focusing on social and professional ties); In re Oracle Corp. Derivative 
Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938–39 (Del. Ch. 2003) (insisting that the independence analysis should 
pay heed to personal and social relationships among directors and finding that such 
relationships negated directors’ independence). 
 104. See In re Oracle Corp., 824 A.2d at 938–39.  
 105. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1051–52 (Del. 2004).  
 106. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court indicated that, at least with respect to attacking 
directors’ independence in the context of shareholder derivative suits, social and professional 
ties would only be relevant in the Zapata inquiry. See id. at 1054–55; see also Cosenza, supra note 
62, at 32 n.123 (noting that the Delaware court limited the Oracle examination to the SLC 
context, as opposed to the pre-suit demand context). However, shareholders are not 
guaranteed to proceed to the Zapata inquiry. In fact, because it is difficult to prove demand 
futility, many shareholders do not proceed to the Zapata stage of the analysis. The Delaware 
Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge that limiting the consideration of social ties to Zapata 
essentially eliminated consideration of those ties with respect to the independence inquiry in 
derivative actions. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055 (noting that the procedural distinction between 
Aronson and Zapata may be “outcome-determinative on the issue of independence”).  
 107. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1051–52. 
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interactions among directors are not alone given serious consideration when 
analyzing a director’s independence.108 For example, in the litigation 
involving the inappropriateness of Walt Disney President Michael Ovitz’s 
compensation package, it was established that Ovitz and Michael Eisner, the 
CEO of Walt Disney, had been friends for twenty-five years before Eisner 
recruited Ovitz to serve as president and director.109 Yet the Delaware court 
reasoned that such friendship did not impact Eisner’s ability to be deemed 
independent for purposes of assessing the derivative action against Ovitz.110 
Other Delaware courts also have ignored lengthy social or business 
relationships when assessing director independence.111 Illuminating 
Delaware’s stance on this issue, former Delaware Supreme Court Justice 
Norman Veasey has noted that courts should not focus on “friendship, golf 
companionship, and social relationships” when determining whether a 
director qualifies as independent under Delaware law.112 
Of course, some discount the impact of social ties on a director’s 
objectivity, and hence independence. Accordingly, judges and corporate-
governance experts alike have insisted that it would be a mistake to presume 
that directors would subordinate their professional reputation and business 
 
 108. See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ.A 19191, 2002 WL 31888343, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002); Kohls v. Duthie, 765 A.2d 1274, 1284 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that 
director independence is not compromised by personal friendship); Benerofe v. Cha, No. 
14614, 1998 WL 83081, at *3 (Del Ch. Feb. 20, 1998) (same for allegations of lifelong 
friendship). Anecdotal evidence abounds regarding the social connections between board 
members. For example, former Massachusetts governor and presidential candidate Mitt 
Romney recently announced that he would be rejoining the board of Marriott International. 
He previously had served for ten years prior to stepping down in 2002. According to the 
Washington Post, “[t]he Marriott and Romney families, both active in the Mormon church, have 
been close for decades, and they have summer homes nearby each other on Lake 
Winnipesaukee in New Hampshire.” Michael S. Rosenwald, Romney Rejoins Marriott Board: Former 
Presidential Candidate To Head New Financial Panel, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2009, at D04. Given the 
current understanding of director independence, it is likely that Romney would be deemed 
independent notwithstanding these long-standing ties with the Marriott family. 
 109. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 352 (Del. Ch. 1998). 
Although Eisner encouraged Disney directors to hire Ovitz, directors became dissatisfied with 
Ovitz’s performance almost immediately and fired him after roughly fourteen months of 
employment. See id. Ovitz’s severance package enabled him to receive $140 million upon his 
termination. See id. at 350. The staggering sum prompted many shareholder lawsuits. 
 110. See id. at 355. 
 111. See, e.g., Litt v. Wycoff, No. Civ.A 19083-NC, 2003 WL 1794724, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
28, 2003) (noting that even longstanding personal friendships would not impede a director’s 
independence); Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 846 A.2d 963, 980–81 (Del. Ch. 
2000) (stating that a fifteen-year personal relationship is insufficient to impact an 
independence inquiry). 
 112. See E. Norman Veasey, The Defining Tension in Corporate Governance in America, 52 BUS. 
LAW. 393, 405 (1997). 
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judgment in order to favor the interests of friends or business associates.113 
Instead, we should presume that other considerations, particularly 
professional reputation, will eclipse any potential for bias stemming from 
social ties.114 
This presumption, however, seems dubious for at least three reasons. 
First, it is not clear that directors’ business and professional reputations 
suffer as a result of “favoring” the social relationships they have with 
managers and board members. Indeed, anecdotal and empirical evidence 
indicates that directors may not experience significant harm when they 
make decisions based on such social relationships. At least some studies 
reveal that directors continue to hold board seats and be accepted within 
the business community even after evidence that they may have acquiesced 
in large frauds.115 
Second, favoring these social relationships might enhance a director’s 
reputation in business circles. Indeed, not only does being a board member 
often depend upon one’s social and professional connections, but 
remaining on the board also depends upon ensuring that those connections 
are not damaged. Thus, directors have strong incentives to behave in ways 
that ensure their continued presence on the board, and such behavior often 
includes compliance with norms against questioning managerial policies.116 
Third, social-science research and other prevailing evidence regarding 
board conduct indicate that social ties can have a profound impact on a 
person’s ability to behave objectively. Anecdotal evidence from corporate 
scandals reflects the compromising nature of social ties. For example, 
congressional investigations regarding Enron and WorldCom found that 
directors had extensive social and professional ties with corporate officers 
and their fellow directors that compromised their ability to be impartial and 
undermined their ability to provide an adequate check on directors’ and 
officers’ conduct.117 Then too, even some Delaware judges have recognized 
the fallacy in assuming that corporate directors’ independence would not be 
 
 113. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
1052 n.32 (Del. 2004); Veasey, supra note 112, at 406 (indicating that it was “dubious” to 
presume that directors’ friendship would compromise their decision). 
 114. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1052 n.32; Veasey, supra note 112, at 405–06. 
 115. See Anup Agrawal et al., Management Turnover and Governance Changes Following the 
Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. & ECON. 309, 339–40 (1999); Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and 
the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & ECON. 365, 366 (2006); Eliezer M. Fich & 
Anil Shivdasani, Financial Fraud, Director Reputation, and Shareholder Wealth, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 306, 
309–10 (2007). 
 116. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 461. 
 117. See BREEDEN, supra note 96. A special report of the Hollinger Board concluded that its 
CEO, Conrad Black, had longstanding social, business, and political ties with directors that 
undermined directors’ ability to be diligent and detect the CEO’s fraud. See SEC v. Black, No. 
04-C-7377, 2009 WL 1181480, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 30, 2009); see also Ralph C. Ferrara, Dealing 
with Private Securities Litigation, in 41ST ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 1035, 
1056 (2009), available at 1774 PLI/Corp 1035 (Westlaw) (describing report). 
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jeopardized as a result of social connections they have with other directors 
or officers.118 In their view, such an assumption ignores the social nature of 
humans.119 That nature has been documented by social-science literature, 
revealing that groups with strong social or personal ties experience 
difficulties impartially assessing one another’s behavior.120 Instead, people 
with strong social ties seek to avoid conflict out of concern that such conflict 
would undermine their friendship and “social capital”—the network of 
relationships they have with fellow board members.121 Applying this 
literature to corporate boards, corporate-governance experts have found 
that when board members have strong social or professional relationships, 
those relationships reduce their capacity to critically scrutinize one another’s 
conduct.122 This finding confirms that social ties likely impact the ability of 
board members to impartially assess each other’s actions. Other research 
supports the notion that business relationships undermine true 
independence, increasing directors’ and officers’ ability to engage in 
corporate fraud.123 
In this regard, the failure to consider these relationships impedes 
directors’ ability to be truly independent. This is true even if such ties may 
have some advantages. Indeed, some maintain that there are advantages to 
social ties among board members. Thus, one social psychologist who studies 
board behavior has argued that social ties may be beneficial in the 
boardroom because such ties increase trust and openness among board 
 
 118. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 938 (Del. Ch. 2003).  
 119. In Oracle, the Court of Chancery of Delaware stated: 
Nor should our law ignore the social nature of humans. To be direct, corporate 
directors are generally the sort of people deeply enmeshed in social institutions. 
Such institutions have norms, expectations that, explicitly and implicitly, influence 
and channel the behavior of those who participate in their operation. . . . In being 
appropriately sensitive to this factor, our law cannot assume—absent some proof of 
that point—that corporate directors are, as a general matter, persons of unusual 
social bravery, who operate heedless to the inhibitions that social norms generate 
for ordinary folk. 
Id. 
 120. See Brudney, supra note 14, at 612–13; Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The 
Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2003). 
 121. See Karen A. Jehn & Priti Pradhan Shah, Interpersonal Relationships and Task Performance: 
An Examination of Mediating Processes in Friendship and Acquaintance Groups, 72 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 775, 778 (1997); Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital, Intellectual 
Capital, and the Organizational Advantage, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 242, 245 (1998); Reed Nelson, 
The Strength of Strong Ties: Social Networks and Intergroup Conflict in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. 
J. 377, 380 (1989). 
 122. See O’Connor, supra note 120, at 1263–64. 
 123. See Hatice Uzun et al., Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–
June 2004, at 33, 41. 
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members, thereby promoting honest feedback.124 Other corporate-
governance scholars concur that people in close social relationships may 
have more candid dialogue because they feel free to criticize one another’s 
actions.125 A strong social relationship between directors and the CEO may 
be especially important because without such a relationship, directors may 
feel reluctant to critique such a powerful officer.126 Then too, CEOs may be 
more likely to seek out advice from people with whom they are close and 
share strong social bonds.127 In this regard, social relationships among 
board members promote better communication in the boardroom. 
Moreover, studies reveal that the collegiality among board members with 
strong social ties enhances their productivity.128 Therefore, there may be 
benefits to social ties in the boardroom, though some question their 
strength.129 
To be sure, these benefits do not negate the drawbacks of such ties. In 
fact, even those who tout the benefits of social ties acknowledge that they 
come at the expense of the drawbacks discussed above, some of which can 
be significant.130 Courts’ and regulators’ failure to acknowledge those 
drawbacks means that the compromising nature of those ties are not 
appropriately examined, let alone appropriately balanced against any 
potential benefits. Hence, that failure impedes the extent to which any 
director truly can be regarded as independent. 
And it is unlikely that this failure will be rectified. Indeed, regulators 
received evidence regarding the impact of these social ties during 
Congressional hearings preceding the enactment of SOX.131 Consequently, 
they had the opportunity to dictate (or at least strongly recommend) that 
boards consider such ties, but elected not to do so. This election does not 
bode well for the potential to reconsider the issue. Similarly, Delaware seems 
to have foreclosed the potential for giving added consideration to social ties. 
Thus, in the aftermath of Enron and similar governance scandals, there was 
significant public outcry for corporate reform. In the context of this outcry, 
Delaware had the opportunity to shift its stance with respect to social ties. 
And in fact, Delaware’s initial decision to analyze social ties more closely 
stemmed from the public’s desire to see effective changes in the board’s 
 
 124. See James D. Westpahl & Edward J. Zajac, Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, 
Reciprocity and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 161, 163–
64 (1997). 
 125. See John F. Olson & Michael T. Adams, Composing a Balanced and Effective Board To Meet 
New Governance Mandates, 59 BUS. LAW. 421, 445–46 (2004). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 810 (2001). 
 129. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 835. 
 130. See Olson & Adams, supra note 125, at 446. 
 131. See BREEDEN, supra note 96. 
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monitoring function.132 However, Delaware’s decision to retreat from that 
analysis signaled its strong desire to adhere to the status quo.133 Given the 
support in favor of change, Delaware’s actions during this period 
underscore the low probability that Delaware will embrace consideration of 
social ties in the future. 
Importantly, many directors have personal and professional ties with 
other directors prior to board service. The refusal to consider those ties may 
stem from a fundamental concern that such consideration would 
undermine the ability to view any director as objective, or at the very least, 
would complicate the apparently difficult task of securing qualified 
independent directors. Courts’ reticence in this area is understandable. 
However, it does not negate the fact that such ties jeopardize our ability to 
secure truly independent directors. Instead, it confirms the relatively low 
probability that such ties will ever be meaningfully considered in the 
independence inquiry. As a result, it affirms the premise that independent 
directors may never sufficiently overcome the limits on their objectivity. 
2. Structural Bias 
Even if courts gave due consideration to social ties, the current 
understanding of director independence fails to consider appropriately the 
ramifications of structural bias. “Structural bias” refers to the bias resulting 
from board members’ interactions with one another after joining the 
board.134 This bias stems from the natural collegiality that emerges as a 
result of working together in a group, as well as the empathy resulting from 
being a part of the group.135 As one court noted, when directors are forced 
to pass upon the behavior of their fellow directors, they cannot help but to 
approach the inquiry from a “there but for the grace of God go I” mentality, 
ensuring that their decisions will not be free from bias.136 
Federal rules fail to acknowledge this structural bias at all. By 
comparison, Delaware has recognized the effects of structural bias in the 
context of shareholder derivative suits.137 In Zapata, the court acknowledged 
the negative impact of structural bias by reserving the ability to reject the 
independent committees’ dismissal decisions. That reservation recognizes 
that independent directors may find it difficult to be impartial when faced 
with the decision whether to allow their fellow directors or officers to be 
 
 132. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 n.62 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(“[R]ecent reforms . . . reflect a narrower conception of who [Congress and the stock 
exchanges] believe can be an independent director.”). 
 133. See Cathy L. Reese & Kelly A. Herring, Recent Developments in Delaware Corporate Law, 7 
DEL. L. REV. 177, 208 (2004) (noting that Delaware’s decisions reaffirm its prior precedents). 
 134. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 861–65. 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981).  
 137. See id. 
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sued.138 However, before shareholders can receive the benefit of a Delaware 
court’s substantive analysis of their suit, they must establish demand futility 
under Aronson. Because proving demand futility is difficult, most 
shareholder–plaintiffs do not get the benefit of a Zapata review. Moreover, 
even when shareholders do reach Zapata, courts overwhelmingly defer to the 
committees’ decisions.139 Thus, the court’s role under Zapata may be more 
illusory than real, diminishing the importance of its consideration of 
structural bias in the independence inquiry.140 
By contrast, psychological research confirms the prevalence of 
structural bias141 and suggests that such bias is extremely relevant to the 
question of director independence. Thus, Professors Cox and Munsinger 
studied the impact of structural bias on board behavior in the context of 
shareholder derivative actions.142 They concluded that structural bias can 
have “subtle, but powerful,” effects on decision making within a boardroom, 
prompting directors to insulate their colleagues from legal sanctions.143 
Professor O’Connor similarly concluded that the psychological research with 
respect to structural bias is particularly relevant in the context of boards, 
highlighting the degree to which such bias undermines directors’ ability to 
be critical of their fellow directors.144 
The existence and impact of structural bias makes it normatively 
difficult to have truly independent directors. To be sure, such bias can be 
minimized. For example, reducing directors’ length of service may reduce 
the effects of structural bias by minimizing the strong social affinity that 
hinders impartiality.145 Furthermore, increasing board diversity could 
reduce the impact of structural bias because such bias is understood to 
flourish in homogeneous and highly cohesive groups.146 As a descriptive 
matter however, the failure of courts and regulators to acknowledge the 
relevance of structural bias makes it difficult to implement mechanisms that 
could minimize such bias. More importantly, research suggests that even if 
such bias can be minimized, it cannot be eradicated. As a result, such bias 
makes it “virtually impossible for directors to be unconflicted in all 
meaningful respects.”147 
 
 138. See id. at 787–88. 
 139. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 845. 
 140. See id. at 843. 
 141. See id. at 860–65. 
 142. See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations 
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85 (1985). 
 143. See id. 
 144. See O’Connor, supra note 120, at 1263–64. 
 145. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 953. 
 146. See O’Connor, supra note 120, at 1263–64. 
 147. See Velasco, supra note 65, at 870. 
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3. Director Compensation 
While courts and commentators at least acknowledge the potentially 
compromising nature of social ties and structural bias, they do not 
acknowledge the problematic ties that may stem from directors’ cash 
compensation.148 It should come as no surprise that directors are 
compensated for their board service. In 2007, the average director received 
some $62,000 in direct compensation149 and $160,000 in total 
compensation.150 In 2009, the average compensation of directors at S&P 
500 companies was more than $200,000, with cash compensation reaching 
an average of about $75,000.151 In 2007, directors in some industries (like 
financial institutions and pharmaceuticals) averaged $200,000 in total 
compensation and close to $70,000 in direct compensation.152 A director’s 
direct compensation consists of an annual retainer, plus meeting fees for 
every committee on which a director serves.153 Directors who chair 
committees receive higher annual retainers and meeting fees.154 Then too, 
directors’ compensation increases when they serve on a committee charged 
with increased responsibilities not only because the annual retainer and 
meeting fees are higher, but also because directors meet more frequently.155 
Audit-committee chairs and members receive the highest compensation.156 
This compensation gets ignored when considering a director’s 
independence. Hence, although federal rules provide that a director’s 
 
 148. To be sure, some attention has focused on the potentially problematic impact of 
equity compensation. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1488, 1536–38 (noting the “distinct set of 
perverse incentives” created by stock-based compensation). In particular, companies have 
focused on the problems associated with awarding stock options. In fact, one study found that 
independent directors also engaged in option backdating. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky 
Directors 2 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Paper No. 573, 2007), available at http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=952239. As a result of concerns related to stock options, boards 
have altered the manner in which they convey stock to their directors, favoring restricted stock 
awards over stock options. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 13. This focus on equity 
compensation does not extend to a focus on cash compensation.  
 149. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 14. “Direct compensation” refers to cash 
compensation. 
 150. See id. at 20. Total compensation includes cash compensation and equity 
compensation. In 2009, outside directors at Harley-Davidson received an average total 
compensation of $506,750 and an average cash retainer of $100,000. See SPENCER STUART, 
supra note 4, at 42. 
 151. See SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 30–32. The average total compensation of S&P 
directors was $212,750, while the average cash compensation for such directors was $75,893. 
 152. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 20. 
 153. See id. at 21. The average annual retainer for an audit-committee chair, for example, is 
about $15,583. It should be noted that according to Spencer Stuart, there is a “trend away from 
meeting fees to retainers for committee leadership and service” at S&P 500 companies. See 
SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 30. 
 154. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 21. 
 155. See id. at 14. 
 156. See id. 
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receipt of fees from the corporation on whose board she serves prevents her 
from being viewed as independent, these rules exclude board 
compensation.157 Delaware courts similarly do not take board compensation 
into account when examining a director’s independence. 
This failure to account for director compensation runs counter to the 
clear consensus regarding the bias-producing nature of financial ties. In the 
independence inquiry, receipt of financial fees from the corporation is the 
quintessential disqualifying tie. Indeed, while courts and regulators differ on 
their definition of independence, they are uniform in their view that receipt 
of financial fees automatically disqualifies someone from being deemed 
independent. To be sure, not all rules treat financial compensation the 
same. Hence, all compensation disqualifies a director from being considered 
independent under SOX.158 Yet the listing agencies only exclude directors if 
they receive direct compensation in excess of a certain threshold. Under 
NASDAQ, for example, direct compensation in excess of $60,000 
disqualifies a director from being viewed as independent, while the NYSE 
threshold is $120,000.159 Based on these rules, if directors’ board fees were 
not excluded, the current amount of such fees would exclude the average 
director from being considered independent under both SOX and 
NASDAQ. On the one hand, these rules reveal that we view the potential for 
bias from financial fees as so strong that we categorically disqualify people 
from being deemed independent even if they have only a single interaction 
with the corporation. On the other hand, the rules’ exclusion regarding 
director fees suggests that merely characterizing such fees as director 
compensation eradicates any potential for bias. Such a suggestion seems 
problematic at best. 
To be sure, one can offer several reasons why director compensation is 
excluded from the independence inquiry. First, director compensation is 
often characterized as nominal, and hence it may not warrant serious 
concern. Concededly, director compensation is nowhere near the levels of 
executive compensation. However, it cannot be considered nominal; indeed, 
the fact that the average directorial compensation package exceeds the 
thresholds for independence under federal rules reflects this. Second, the 
fact that directors have other sources of compensation may reduce any 
concern that their board compensation may jeopardize their impartiality. 
Indeed, many independent directors have full-time jobs,160 and when 
compared against their salary at those jobs, their board fees may be relatively 
 
 157. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 158. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 159. See NASDAQ, supra note 17, at r. 4200(a)(15). The NYSE disqualifies directors only if 
they receive direct compensation in excess of $120,000. See NYSE, supra note 17, § 303A.02. 
 160. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 18 (demonstrating that most boards have 
directors who serve as CEOs and COOs of other companies); SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 
13 (demonstrating that most new independent directors are active executives or professionals). 
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insignificant. Then too, other independent directors are former executives 
and hence may be independently wealthy.161 To be sure, the existence of 
other sources of funding does not appear to have any bearing on the 
independence analysis for other individuals. Also, consultants and advisors 
likely have additional sources of income but nevertheless are excluded from 
the definition of independence if they receive funds from the corporation 
on whose board they sit.162 This fact undercuts the theory that an outside 
director’s alternative source of income minimizes the compromising nature 
of director compensation. 
Of course, the most pragmatic rationale behind the failure to consider 
board fees in the independence inquiry is that such consideration would 
result in no one being viewed as independent. Hence, such compensation 
cannot be used to measure a director’s independence. In light of the 
compromising nature of financial ties, however, the fact that we cannot 
consider those ties underscores the inherent limitations in the quest for true 
director independence. 
4. Climate Changes 
When viewed in context of the current demands on independent 
directors, the prospects for meaningfully minimizing any of the 
aforementioned ties seem bleak. Such ties, particularly those resulting from 
structural bias and director fees, are an inevitable feature of board service. 
Moreover, as we increase our reliance on independent directors, such ties 
deepen. Thus, as directors have greater responsibility, they inevitably spend 
more time together, thereby increasing their social interactions. Hence, this 
current climate increases the likelihood that there will be enhanced social 
ties and structural bias. Then too, independent directors are being paid 
more.163 This is because it is difficult to increase directors’ responsibilities 
without a corresponding increase in compensation.164 Indeed, because 
many directors are paid on a per-meeting basis, their compensation 
increases with the frequency of their meetings. Therefore, like social ties and 
structural bias, these financial ties not only appear to be an inevitable 
feature of board service, but also are likely to increase as we continue to rely 
on independent directors. Hence, as we increase our dependence on 
 
 161. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 18 (revealing that many directors are 
retired executives). 
 162. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (indicating that the federal rules cover 
anyone compensated by the corporation). 
 163. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 13. Spencer Stuart did note a 2% decline 
in overall director compensation at S&P 500 companies from 2008–2009, along with a 1% 
increase in annual cash retainers. SPENCER STUART, supra note 4, at 30, 32. Of course even if 
such compensation is increasing at a relatively smaller rate, the amount still appears significant 
enough to warrant concern regarding its potential to impact a director’s objectivity. 
 164. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 13. 
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independent directors, we reduce our ability to minimize these 
compromising ties, thereby reducing the extent to which independent 
directors can be characterized as truly independent. 
B. SELECTION BIAS 
The current director-selection process in public corporations also 
undermines a director’s ability to be truly independent and perform her 
monitoring roles with sufficient rigor. In public corporations, shareholders 
vote by proxy, which means that they vote without being physically present at 
the annual meeting.165 In order to vote by proxy, a proxy statement that 
includes the names of the directorial candidates must be distributed to all 
shareholders.166 Hence, the corporation annually distributes a proxy 
statement to its shareholders so that they can vote on directorial 
candidates.167 Currently, only the names of candidates supported by 
incumbent managers and directors appear on a corporation’s proxy 
statement; corporations can and do exclude the names of candidates 
supported by shareholders.168 This exclusion means that although 
shareholders can nominate their own candidates, the only way that those 
candidates can be voted upon is if shareholders distribute their own proxy 
statement. The expenses associated with such a distribution can be 
prohibitive, making it extremely difficult for most shareholders to nominate 
and elect candidates of their choice.169 Shareholders’ inability to nominate 
their candidates on the corporation’s proxy statement means that the vast 
majority of directors are chosen by other directors and run unopposed.170 
 
 165. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 360 (1986). 
 166. See Exchange Act Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(a)(8) (2010). The proxy 
statement also contains information about the candidates to be voted on. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2010) (providing 
exclusions for shareholder proposals related to election of directors). 
 169. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
833, 856 (2005); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REV. 
1489, 1499 (1970). The SEC has recognized that the tremendous costs associated with proxy 
campaigns mean that such campaigns are not really feasible. See Re-Examination of Rules 
Relating to Shareholder Communications, 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (Apr. 28, 1977). 
 170. Indeed, historically, proxy contests have been rare. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 
865 (noting that outside of the hostile-takeover context, there are roughly eleven proxy 
contests a year). While such contests recently have increased, they nevertheless remain 
expensive and hence limited when viewed against the thousands of directors selected each year. 
See id. But see Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 
733, 737–38 (2007) (questioning Bebchuk’s claims regarding the dearth of proxy contests 
based on his failure to pinpoint the optimal number of proxy contests).  
  Recently, the SEC implemented an e-proxy system aimed at reducing the costs of 
distributing proxy statements and thus increasing the ability of shareholders to engage in proxy 
contests. See Internet Availability of Proxy Materials, 72 Fed. Reg. 4,148 (Jan. 29, 2007) 
(codified in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.). That system enables shareholders to distribute the 
proxy statement electronically, thereby reducing the substantial printing and mailing costs 
A3 - FAIRFAX.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  2:13 PM 
158 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:127 
This process undermines director independence and the 
corresponding monitoring function. The shareholder franchise is supposed 
to enhance managerial accountability.171 In other words, shareholders’ 
ability to vote directors out of office or refuse to elect them into office 
should prompt directors to pay heed to their monitoring responsibilities.172 
Moreover, shareholders’ power to replace directors should encourage them 
to make decisions beneficial to shareholders.173 However, the director-
selection process means that such power does not exist in any meaningful 
respect. Instead, directors may feel beholden to their fellow directors 
because those directors nominate them and therefore control their ability to 
remain on the board.174 In fact, studies reveal that CEOs often dominate the 
director-nomination process, causing directors to feel beholden to CEOs.175 
Thus, the director-selection process does little to incentivize effective 
monitoring and instead increases the potential for managerial and CEO 
capture.176 Then too, this process enhances the structural bias within the 
boardroom because it increases the extent to which directors view their fate 
as linked with their fellow directors. Therefore, the director-selection 
process impedes the ability of directors to be truly independent.177 
Recognizing the potential for managerial and CEO capture inherent in 
the director-selection process, reforms have not only required boards to 
create nominating committees, but also have required that those committees 
be comprised of independent directors.178 A nominating committee is 
charged with locating and nominating qualified directorial candidates.179 
Separate nominating committees are designed to ensure that directors 
locate qualified candidates without unwarranted influence from 
management in general and the CEO in particular.180 The belief was that 
eliminating managers and CEOs from the selection process would ensure 
 
associated with delivering proxy materials. While it is too soon to determine if those rules will 
have an impact on the rate of proxy campaigns, early evidence suggests that it may have 
disenfranchised some voters.  
 171. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 851. 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. 
 174. See id. at 856; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999); Cosenza, supra note 62, at 43–45; Eisenberg, supra note 
169, at 1504. 
 175. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 856; Borowski, supra note 8, at 460 (noting that the 
“fatal flaw” in board structure is the ability of corporate managers to select directorial 
candidates); Cosenza, supra note 62, at 49–50. 
 176. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 856; Borowski, supra note 8, at 460. 
 177. See Brudney, supra note 14, at 621; Cosenza, supra note 62, at 43–45. 
 178. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1498 (discussing reforms). 
 179. See id. 
 180. See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1038. 
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the independence of directors, realigning directors’ interests with 
shareholders and enhancing the efficacy of their monitoring.181 
Unfortunately, this solution may not alleviate the capture problem. 
First, notwithstanding the creation of independent nominating committees, 
evidence reveals that CEOs continue to influence the director-nomination 
process through informal consultations and recommendations of directorial 
candidates.182 Hence, boards continue to appoint people with social and 
professional connections to the CEO and other managers. And because our 
definition of independent director fails to consider these social ties, these 
directors are deemed independent. Second, even if nominating committees 
alleviate the concerns associated with managerial and CEO capture, they fail 
to ensure that directors are free from bias with respect to other directors. 
Thus, evidence reveals that directors have substantial social and professional 
ties with their fellow directors.183 In fact, even when boards rely on search 
firms, they gravitate towards candidates with whom they have some shared 
history or relationships.184 At best, therefore, we have exchanged managerial 
capture for board capture. As a result, nominating committees do not 
alleviate concerns that directors will feel beholden to their fellow directors 
when making decisions regarding their conduct. Thus, those committees do 
not alleviate concerns about directors’ impartiality and ability to monitor 
effectively. 
Some corporate scholars contend that the ideal solution to selection 
bias is to increase shareholders’ role in the nomination process by allowing 
them access to the corporation’s proxy statement.185 Such access ensures 
that shareholder-supported candidates have an opportunity to be included 
on the corporate proxy statement, increasing the chances that directors’ 
interest will be aligned with that of the shareholders. Because it creates the 
real potential that shareholders can replace directors, proxy access also 
incentivizes all directors to pay heed to shareholder interests, thereby 
invigorating directors’ monitoring role. 
In August 2010, as this Article was going to press, the SEC passed a 
proxy-access rule for the first time in its history.186 Shareholder-rights groups 
had been advocating for access to the proxy for decades. However, the SEC 
 
 181. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 460. 
 182. See Uzun et al., supra note 123, at 41 (noting chief executives’ influence in certain 
committees). 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. Often search firms will have business relationships with the company. See 
Gordon, supra note 30, at 1498. 
 185. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 856; Cosenza, supra note 62, at 43. 
 186. See, e.g., Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release Nos. 
33-9136, 34-62764 (Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-913 
6.pdf; Neal Lipschutz, ‘Proxy Access’ Era Begins; Welcome to the Unknown, WALL. ST. J., Aug. 25, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703632304575451892123490472. 
html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTWhatsNewsCollection. 
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had repeatedly denied that access.187 Thus, in the past, on each occasion 
that the SEC has had the opportunity to consider proxy access, the SEC has 
rejected it based largely on staunch opposition and criticism from business 
groups.188 This occurred most recently in 2007, when the SEC considered, 
but then rejected, a proxy-access proposal.189 In July 2009, the SEC once 
again proposed a proxy-access proposal.190 After considerable debate and 
opposition, the SEC approved a rule that requires public corporations to 
provide proxy access to its shareholders.191 
Even with the new rule, it is not clear if proxy access actually can 
improve directors’ monitoring function. Recently, shareholders have been 
more active and thus have waged more proxy contests.192 Empirical 
evidence reveals that when those contests appear likely to be successful, most 
directors negotiate with the shareholders to retain their board seats.193 
Hence, many proxy contests result in negotiated settlement agreements, 
pursuant to which the board is expanded to accommodate one or two 
shareholder-supported candidates.194 Moreover, shareholders often 
nominate only a “short slate” of candidates.195 That is, shareholders do not 
seek to replace the entire board; rather they seek to replace some 
percentage of the board, typically less than a majority. Thus, when 
shareholders successfully secure board seats via either settlement or 
 
 187. See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-48626, 68 
Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003) (proposed proxy-access rule ultimately abandoned by the 
SEC); Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-19135, 47 Fed. Reg. 47,420 (Oct. 26, 1982) (considering and 
rejecting a proposal to grant proxy access in 1982); Jayne W. Barnard, Shareholder Access to the 
Proxy Revisited, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 37, 47 (1990) (describing the SEC’s consideration and 
rejection of a proxy access rule in 1942). 
 188. See Barnard, supra note 187, at 47; Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing 
Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1163 (1993); see also Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-20091, 48 Fed. Reg. 38,218 (Aug. 16, 1983) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) 
(noting minimal support for Proposal III, which called for security holders to have unrestricted 
access to proxy statements). 
 189. See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Exchange Act Release 
No. 34-56914, 72 Fed. Reg. 70,450 (Dec. 11, 2007) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240). 
 190. See Facilitating Shareholder and Director Nominations, SEC Release Nos. 33-9046, 34-
60089 (proposed June 10, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2009/33-
9046.pdf. 
 191. See Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, supra note 186; Zach Goldfarb, SEC 
Votes To Allow Proxy Access, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ 
market-cop/2010/08/sec_votes_to_allow_proxy_acces.html; Lipschutz, supra note 186. 
 192. See INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., 2006 POSTSEASON REPORT: SPOTLIGHT ON 
EXECUTIVE PAY AND BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY 6, 27 (2006), available at http://www.riskmetrics. 
com/system/files/private/2006PostSeasonReportFINAL.pdf (describing increase in 
shareholder proposals). 
 193. See SHARKREPELLENT, STUDY OF ACTIVISTS CAMPAIGNS 2008 (on file with author). 
 194. See id. 
 195. See id. 
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successful election, their actions do not result in the wholesale displacement 
of management candidates. This suggests that proxy access is not likely to 
reverse the status quo, pursuant to which boardrooms are largely populated 
with directors selected by management as opposed to shareholders. As a 
result, proxy access may not decrease the number of people on the board 
that may be impacted by selection bias, except indirectly. Moreover, the 
evidence suggests that once shareholder-supported candidates secure 
election to the board, they tend to adapt to board culture rather than 
becoming forceful advocates for shareholders.196 In other words, the nature 
of their selection does not negate the bias that occurs as a result of being a 
board member.197 Given the literature related to structural bias, this result 
should not be surprising. Consequently, while increased access to the proxy 
may result in increased director independence at the margins, it does not 
significantly reduce the bias of board members, and thus may not 
significantly enhance directors’ monitoring abilities. 
C. INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES 
Informational asymmetries inherent in the role of independent 
directors further limit such directors’ ability to be effective monitors. In 
order for a director to be effective, she needs accurate information.198 As 
one scholar acknowledges, “Uninformed independence has limited 
value . . . .”199 However, the fact that independent directors are outsiders, 
and hence not engaged in the daily affairs of the corporation, means that 
they are dependent on the insiders that they must monitor to supply them 
with the information necessary to discharge their responsibilities.200 To the 
extent we are concerned that insiders may inappropriately filter or otherwise 
manipulate the information, independent directors may not alleviate this 
concern. This is because such directors’ outsider status makes it difficult for 
them to verify the accuracy of the information, and thus difficult to be 
effective monitors. 
The primary corporate-governance response to the informational-
asymmetry problem has been reliance on “gatekeepers” such as advisors, 
 
 196. See id. 
 197. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 462 (“It is unlikely that changing the method of selection 
of board members will alter significantly the tendency of independent board members to favor 
management.”). 
 198. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern 
Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 375, 404 (1975) (noting the 
importance of obtaining accurate and objective information); see also Bainbridge, supra note 72, 
at 1055–56 (noting that those with decision-making power must have information that is not 
distorted). 
 199. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1541. 
 200. See Cox, supra note 52, at 1082. 
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attorneys, and accountants.201 These gatekeepers should reduce the 
problems associated with informational asymmetries by providing 
independent directors with an alternate and impartial source of 
information, thereby ensuring that they are not wholly dependent on 
insiders. Moreover, these gatekeepers are supposed to verify the integrity of 
the information provided by company insiders. 
However, reliance on gatekeepers does not necessarily reduce the 
problem of informational asymmetries, nor does it adequately enhance the 
efficiency of corporate monitoring. First, even gatekeepers depend upon 
insiders for their supply of information.202 Thus, gatekeepers’ presence does 
not negate the insider’s ability to dominate, and therefore potentially 
manipulate, the flow of information. Second, gatekeepers may be unreliable 
because they are subject to their own conflicts of interest that could lead 
them to manipulate data or otherwise rubber-stamp decisions made by 
managers.203 The unreliability of gatekeepers reflects one of the principal 
insights of the corporate-governance scandals of 2002.204 Those scandals 
also indicated that when gatekeepers fail in their responsibility, independent 
directors are unable to take up the slack, not only because such directors 
cannot monitor gatekeepers to ensure their impartiality, but also because 
such directors cannot ensure the integrity and clarity of financial reporting 
without the assistance of gatekeepers.205 Third, evidence suggests that these 
gatekeepers are also impacted by structural bias and therefore find it 
difficult to be truly objective.206 Indeed, such gatekeepers come to view 
themselves as a part of the managerial team, reducing their ability to 
 
 201. See id. at 1082–83; Cunningham, supra note 65, at 327–29 (noting the gatekeepers’ 
role in certifying information). 
 202. See Eisenberg, supra note 198, at 404. 
 203. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance 
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. 413, 419 (2004) (noting that auditors face 
inherent conflicts and capture that impair the efficacy of their reporting). 
 204. See id.; see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of 
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 318–33 (2004) (explaining why gatekeepers 
should have detected the accounting irregularities in the 2001–2002 cases but did not); 
Gordon, supra note 30, at 1538. 
 205. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1538–39; see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of 
Interests and Corporate Governance Failures at Universal Banks During the Stock Market Boom of the 
1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 97, 100–20 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2007) (chronicling banks’ role in the downfall of 
Enron and WorldCom, as well as the conflicts and other factors that caused banks to acquiesce 
to, and participate in, corporate misconduct). 
 206. See Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: 
Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 101, 109–10 (1985); 
Charles M. Elson & Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 872–73 (2003). 
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criticize that team.207 Hence, reliance on gatekeepers does not overcome 
directors’ informational disadvantage. 
Another solution to the informational-asymmetries problem focuses on 
public disclosure of corporate information.208 Indeed, over the last fifty 
years, the SEC has sought to require better and more accurate disclosure 
from public companies.209 Such disclosure is aimed at ensuring that 
directors are not wholly dependent on insiders, but instead can rely on the 
disclosure regime to ensure the accuracy and integrity of corporate 
information. To the extent the disclosure regime imparts accurate 
information, that regime ensures that independent directors will not be at 
an informational disadvantage.210 According to Professor Gordon, the 
disclosure regime ensures that the stock market is well-informed, increasing 
the informativeness of stock price.211 As a result, Professor Gordon argues 
that the disclosure regime ameliorates the independent directors’ 
information deficit and thus enhances such directors’ ability to perform 
their oversight functions.212 
However, this argument appears flawed for a variety of reasons. First, 
many scholars maintain that stock price is not accurate. Instead, the price 
incorporates noise.213 Consequently, many have asserted that stock price 
fails to reflect fundamental value, but rather may be irrational.214 The 
existence of noise undermines the informativeness of stock price and thus 
undermines the reliability of the information such price imparts to 
independent directors. Second, the focus on short-term stock price 
encourages independent directors to acquiesce in management’s price-
manipulation practices for at least two reasons. The first is because 
independent directors come to view stock price as a measure of success and 
thus have incentives to ensure that the measure remains high. The second is 
that the increase in stock-based compensation for directors increases 
directors’ bias in favor of practices that augment, if not manipulate, stock 
 
 207. See Baysinger & Butler, supra note 206, at 109–10; Elson & Gyves, supra note 206, at 
872–73. 
 208. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1541–43 (noting that the disclosure regime has aligned 
the interests of the independent director and shareholders). 
 209. See id. at 1548–51. 
 210. See id. at 1542–43. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. at 1541. 
 213. See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 529–30 (1986); Erik F. Gerding, The Next 
Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 398 
(2006); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency 
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 858–72 (1992); see also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly 
Casinos?: Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 628–29 (1995) 
(noting that investors are not necessarily irrational, but that markets nevertheless produce 
prices that depart from fundamental value). 
 214. See Black, supra note 213, at 529–30; Gerding, supra note 213, at 398; Langevoort, 
supra note 213, at 858–72; Stout, supra note 213, at 628–29. 
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price.215 Hence, evidence reveals that independent directors not only were 
complicit in stock-based fraud such as option backdating, but also that they 
benefited from them through the receipt of opportunistically timed stock-
option grants.216 In this regard, the focus on stock price may undermine 
independent directors’ objectivity, while the potential for fraud undermines 
the integrity of information reflected by the stock price. 
Third, even if a stock price conveys accurate information, it is not 
narrowly tailored enough to assist independent directors in making or 
monitoring strategic decisions.217 Thus, the information it conveys may be 
too general to surmount its informational disadvantage. Finally, the notion 
that the disclosure regime overcomes the independent directors’ 
informational disadvantages is somewhat circular. In order for the disclosure 
regime to overcome independent directors’ informational disadvantage, the 
regime must convey accurate information. However, the conveyance of 
accurate information depends upon the independent director’s ability to 
verify the accuracy and integrity of such information. In other words, 
independent directors can only verify the accuracy of the information by 
reliance on the disclosure regime, which in turn relies upon the directors 
for its efficiency. The circularity of this problem illuminates the flaws in the 
presumption that the disclosure regime overcomes the informational-
asymmetries problem.218 
As this discussion reveals, informational asymmetries may significantly 
curtail independent directors’ effectiveness as monitors. Because the 
solutions aimed to overcome this problem are flawed at best, independent 
directors’ monitoring abilities may also be flawed at best. 
D. THE KNOWLEDGE DEFICIT 
The fact that the current conception of an independent director fails to 
consider the necessary expertise of a director further undermines the 
directors’ ability to be effective. Except in the audit committee, no reform 
focuses on the affirmative skills or knowledge directors need in order to 
properly perform their responsibilities.219 Thus, studies reveal that while 
 
 215. See Bebchuk, supra note 148, at 1; Gordon, supra note 30, at 1536–37. 
 216. See sources cited supra note 215.  
 217. See Abramowicz & Henderson, supra note 56, at 1362–63 (noting the significant 
disadvantages of relying on stock prices to reduce agency costs, particularly the fact that such 
prices are too blunt). Professors Abramowicz and Henderson maintain that prediction markets 
may provide an alternate source of information that could enhance directors’ monitoring role. 
See id. at 1375–76. 
 218. This circularity also may provide tentative support for Professors Abramowicz and 
Henderson’s case for the reliance on prediction markets in corporate governance. Such 
reliance may be more effective than reliance on the disclosure regime because those markets 
represent an alternate source of information and do not necessarily depend upon independent 
directors for their accuracy and integrity. See id. at 1350–60.  
 219. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, 15 U.S.C § 7265 (2006). 
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many directors have knowledge about general business matters, few have 
knowledge regarding the particular industry on whose board they sit, and 
even fewer have knowledge about the specific company on whose board they 
sit.220 Indeed, even when former executives sit on a board, their knowledge 
is limited to the historical practices at the company. Thus, they do not have 
knowledge of current affairs or events. 
This knowledge deficit is troubling. Recently, scholars have argued that 
corporate-governance literature has largely ignored the knowledge 
resources necessary to enhance corporate governance.221 Such scholars 
maintain that a monitoring system that relies on people without sufficient 
knowledge is not only inefficient, but potentially damaging.222 In other 
words, even if directors received accurate and adequate information, they 
may lack the ability to understand that information, and thus they may also 
lack the ability to detect deficiencies with respect to that information.223 
Corporate-governance scandals tend to confirm that many directors lack the 
knowledge and expertise to sufficiently appreciate the complexities 
associated with their business, and that such lack of knowledge impedes the 
effectiveness of their oversight.224 The knowledge deficit also increases the 
likelihood that independent directors will acquiesce in managerial decisions 
because their lack of knowledge will prompt inappropriate deference. 
Then too, independent directors are limited in their ability to overcome 
this knowledge deficit. As an initial matter, a director’s independence 
ensures that she has other commitments and hence cannot devote an 
inordinate amount of time to her board duties. Indeed, even though 
directors increase the amount of time they spend on board matters, they 
nevertheless are limited in the time they can commit to gaining knowledge 
about company affairs.225 Moreover, most corporations are large and 
decentralized with widespread activities, enhancing the difficulties with 
 
 220. See Margaret A. Bancroft, Knowledge Is Power: What Went Wrong in the Mutual Fund 
Industry, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 145, 155 (2006) (noting that independent directors do not have 
even experience relevant to the industry, let alone specific experience related to the company 
on whose board they serve). 
 221. See Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm 
Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1125 (2007). 
 222. See id. at 1164. 
 223. See Olson & Adams, supra note 125, at 431 (noting that a lack of familiarity with a 
corporation’s business and its risks has the potential to reduce a director’s ability to detect 
misconduct). 
 224. See Report of the Investigation in the Matter of Sterling Homex Corp., Exchange Act 
Release No. 34-11516 (July 2, 1975), 1975 WL 163038 (noting that independent directors 
lacked sufficient grasp of the company’s practices to make informed decisions); Charles Forelle 
& James Bandler, How Did UnitedHealth’s McGuire Get Same Options Twice?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 
2006, at B1 (noting directors did not fully understand option transaction). 
 225. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 10, 27. Board members spend more time 
at their duties, averaging sixteen hours per month. To be sure, that is about a half an hour per 
day. 
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gaining sufficient knowledge about those activities.226 Finally, the 
complexities involved with many of today’s business transactions handicap 
directors’ ability to become proficient in their company’s affairs.227 Taken as 
a whole, the fact that independent directors are not actively engaged in 
management “limits what it [is] reasonable for the board to know.”228 In this 
regard, the knowledge deficit may prove difficult to surmount. 
Some corporate experts contend that this knowledge deficit may prove 
beneficial. Thus, Professor Gordon argues that independent directors’ lack 
of firm-specific knowledge enables them to bring an important external 
perspective to board decision making.229 It also decreases the extent to 
which such directors rely on insiders or otherwise give unwarranted 
deference to insiders.230 For example, Professor Gordon claims that 
directors’ knowledge deficit, at least with respect to firm-specific 
information, may be advantageous. 
However, this claim is debatable. As an initial matter, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that the knowledge deficit may in fact enhance board 
deference because board members may feel uncomfortable challenging 
decisions that they do not understand.231 Then too, directors’ knowledge 
deficit may decrease the value of any external perspective they bring, while 
increasing the extent to which directors engage in inappropriate herd 
behavior. In other words, when directors do not have sufficient knowledge 
to understand the nature of transactions in which their companies engage, 
their external perspective is uninformed.232 Moreover, without sufficient 
knowledge about a company’s internal practices, directors may not use 
outside performance signals to critically analyze those policies, but instead 
may rely on such signals to validate the appropriateness of those practices. 
Hence, directors’ lack of knowledge encourages them to engage in herd-like 
behavior pursuant to which directors acquiesce in practices merely because 
other companies also engage in those practices. This reveals that while 
external perspectives may have value, such perspectives can be 
counterproductive when outsiders lack sufficient expertise. 
To be sure, some corporations have sought to overcome the knowledge 
deficit by focusing on director expertise during recruitment. However, this 
focus is difficult in light of the requirements for director independence. 
 
 226. See id. (noting the difficulties with harnessing knowledge in decentralized firms where 
employees have highly specialized knowledge and hence enhanced discretion). 
 227. See James P. Holdcroft & Jonathan R. Macey, Flexibility in Determining the Role of the Board 
of Directors in the Age of Information, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 294–95 (1997). 
 228. See Mitchell, supra note 45, at 41–42. 
 229. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1563. 
 230. See id. (noting that looking to outside indicators ensures that independent directors 
are “less captured by internal perspective”). 
 231. See supra notes 223–24. 
 232. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 221, at 1164. 
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Those requirements not only limit the overall pool of qualified directors, but 
also limit the pool of candidates with needed industry expertise, since such 
candidates are most likely to be insiders. 
E. INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR LIABILITY, OR LACK THEREOF 
This section contends that the reluctance to impose liability on 
independent directors may also reduce their effectiveness. Indeed, the law 
imposes an increasing amount of responsibilities on independent directors 
but essentially fails to impose any legal sanctions on such directors for their 
failure to adhere to those responsibilities. This failure significantly reduces 
the extent to which independent directors are held accountable. It also 
significantly reduces the extent to which independent directors are deterred 
from shirking their obligations. Indeed, one critical purpose of legal 
sanctions is to deter misconduct by making the costs of such conduct 
outweigh its benefits.233 However, if there is no significant risk of liability, 
then such liability has very little deterrent value.234 Consequently, the virtual 
failure to impose legal sanctions on independent directors means that such 
directors may not be properly motivated to carry out their responsibilities. 
As a result, that failure undermines their effectiveness. 
In an effort to ensure adherence to their various monitoring duties, the 
law imposes various fiduciary duties on directors. At the state level, those 
duties encompass the duty of care, which demands that directors make 
decisions in the best interest of the corporation,235 and the duty of loyalty, 
which regulates director conduct when there is some conflict of interest.236 
Delaware recently made clear that the duty of loyalty includes the duty of 
oversight, encompassing the obligation to effectively monitor the actions of 
officers and directors.237 The federal securities laws also impose obligations 
on independent directors, holding them responsible for accurate and 
 
 233. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, Street Crime, Corporate Crime, and the Contingency of Criminal 
Liability, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1295, 1325 (2001); William J. Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the 
Effectiveness of Legal Sanctions, 1967 WIS. L. REV. 703; Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic 
Analysis of the Criminal Law as Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 5; Richard A. Posner, 
An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1205–06 (1985). 
 234. See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: 
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 578–79 (1996); 
Penalties for White Collar Crime: Are We Really Getting Tough on Crime?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony. 
cfm?id=310&wit_id=711 (statement of Professor John C. Coffee, Jr.). 
 235. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (discussing informed business judgment as a component of 
the duty of care). 
 236. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 403 (Del. 1987). 
 237. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (noting that the fiduciary duty 
violated by an oversight failure is the duty of loyalty). 
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reliable disclosures.238 All of these duties are aimed at ensuring that 
independent directors carry out their jobs in a diligent fashion and do not 
place their interests ahead of corporate interests. However, independent 
directors rarely face liability, either civil or criminal, for breaching their 
duties. 
1. Liability in the Civil Context 
Confirming this point with respect to civil liability, Professors Black, 
Cheffins, and Klausner conducted an extensive investigation of outside-
director liability.239 The investigation revealed that while there are 
thousands of suits involving corporate- or securities-law violations filed each 
year, those suits rarely name independent directors as defendants.240 Even 
when such directors are named defendants, they rarely face trial. Professor 
Black and his co-authors only discovered eight securities trials and twelve 
direct shareholder suits where independent directors were defendants when 
the trial commenced.241 
Even when they go to trial, independent directors are rarely found 
liable and that liability almost never results in out-of-pocket damages. Thus, 
their research only found one case where outside directors paid damages 
after trial.242 That case, Smith v. Van Gorkom, is well-known in corporate 
circles as the one major example of independent directors being held liable 
for breaching their fiduciary duties.243 Independent directors’ virtual 
absence from the liability regime results primarily from a combination of 
insurance, indemnification, and statutory protections that make it nearly 
impossible to extract monetary damages from independent directors.244 
Indeed, those statutory protections ensure that a Van Gorkom-type action will 
no longer result in out-of-pocket liability.245 In this respect, Van Gorkom is 
the exception that proves the rule disfavoring independent-director liability. 
Other studies confirm this pattern. Thus, a five-year study of SEC 
enforcement actions found that while the SEC had filed over five hundred 
actions against some seven hundred corporate defendants, none of those 
defendants were independent directors.246 
 
 238. See Sale, supra note 13, at 1383–88 (explaining independent directors’ role as 
securities monitors). 
 239. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1062–63 
(2006) (describing study). 
 240. See id. at 1064. 
 241. See id. at 1065–67. 
 242. See id. at 1066. 
 243. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 243 (2002). 
 244. See Black et al., supra note 239, at 1059. 
 245. See id. 
 246. See Sale, supra note 13, at 1379. 
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Independent-director liability resulting from settlements is also 
extremely rare. Most cases do not go to trial but instead result in 
settlement.247 However, independent directors have no significant presence 
in this arena. Thus, of the thousands of settled cases over the past twenty-five 
years, only twelve cases involved independent directors.248 In most of those 
cases, the settlements involved nominal amounts.249 Most of the cases 
involving significant amounts were also the most recent and the most 
infamous, including Tyco, WorldCom, and Enron.250 According to Professor 
Black and his co-authors, the circumstances that made liability possible in 
those cases are unlikely to reoccur.251 Hence, they concluded that directors 
would continue to have a significantly low risk of liability for money damages 
in settlements. 
2. Liability in the Criminal Context 
A similar pattern emerges with respect to criminal prosecutions. 
Historically, very few actions have been brought against white-collar 
criminals.252 Moreover, even if such actions are brought, corporate actors 
rarely face trial and seldom face any significant criminal penalties or jail 
time.253 After the corporate scandals of 2002, criminal prosecutions and 
convictions involving corporate actors rose dramatically. However, none of 
those actions have involved independent directors. For example, the five-
year anniversary report from the Department of Justice Corporate Fraud 
Task Force revealed that such Task Force had secured more than 1200 
convictions against various corporate officers, directors, and affiliates.254 
None of these convictions involved independent directors. Hence, even in 
today’s climate of enhanced focus on white-collar crime, independent 
directors have escaped liability. This escape ensures that independent 
directors face a relatively low risk of liability. 
3. A Closer Analysis of Director Culpability 
To be sure, independent directors’ virtual absence from the liability 
regime may indicate simply that they are less culpable than other actors. In 
 
 247. See Black et al., supra note 239, at 1067. 
 248. See id. at 1060. 
 249. See id. at 1068. 
 250. See id. at 1068–70. 
 251. See id. at 1128–29 (describing the WorldCom and Enron cases as “perfect storms” that 
are unlikely to occur again and thus do not signal a significant change in the risk of liability 
facing outside directors).  
 252. See Fairfax, supra note 13, at 440–41; see also supra text accompanying note 13 (noting 
that legal sanctions have very little deterrent value). 
 253. See Fairfax, supra note 13, at 440–41. 
 254. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: President’s Corporate Fraud Task 
Force Marks Five Years of Ensuring Corporate Integrity (July 17, 2007), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/2007/July/07_odag_507.html. 
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other words, it could be the case that independent directors do not engage 
in corporate wrongdoing, at least in any significant respect. And, in fact, 
most cases reveal that such directors are not the primary actors in corporate 
fraud.255 Instead, their involvement is limited to their oversight (or lack of 
oversight) of such fraud.256 However, those cases suggest that while 
independent directors may not have committed the fraud at issue, they may 
have failed to perform their oversight responsibilities with sufficient rigor.257 
Thus, such cases reveal instances where independent directors failed to 
sufficiently monitor other officers and directors, thereby failing to detect or 
prevent corporate misconduct.258 From this perspective, there is a seeming 
disconnect between directors’ lack of liability and their conduct. 
This disconnect is best explained by the affirmative decision to give 
greater leeway to independent directors.259 For example, under Delaware 
law, outside of self-dealing cases, the standard for holding independent 
directors liable is extremely high, making it extremely difficult to find such 
directors liable for breaching their duties.260 Thus, when directors make 
seemingly inappropriate decisions, courts analyze those decisions under the 
business judgment rule, pursuant to which courts presume that the actions 
of independent directors are carried out in good faith and in the best 
interests of the corporation.261 The rule focuses on the process, rather than 
the substance, of board decisions and is designed to prevent second-guessing 
of corporate decisions.262 Overcoming the rule’s presumption requires 
proving that there is no rational basis for the directors’ decision or that the 
 
 255. See Sale, supra note 13, at 1388. 
 256. See id. at 1382–84 (describing directors’ role as securities monitors). 
 257. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting 
that directors had adopted a “we do not care about the risks” attitude); Black et al., supra note 
239, at 1121 (noting reports that WorldCom directors utterly failed in their oversight); Charles 
Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1 (noting that 
directors’ oversight failures enabled option-backdating to occur); Mitchell, supra note 45, at 61 
(noting that Disney reflected an example of a very low level of directorial oversight). 
 258. See In re Walt Disney Co., 825 A.2d at 289; Black, supra note 239, at 1121; Mitchell, 
supra note 45, at 61.  
 259. See Mitchell, supra note 45, at 29 (noting that the monitoring-board structure is aimed 
at shielding directors from liability). 
 260. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (explaining 
the court’s reluctance to substitute its judgment for that of the board); Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of 
the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions Through the Business 
Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REV. 591, 591 (1983) (finding only seven cases holding directors 
liable for breaching the duty of care); Charles Hansen, The ALI Corporate Governance Project: Of 
the Duty of Due Care and the Business Judgment Rule, a Commentary, 41 BUS. LAW. 1237, 1239–40 
(1986) (noting that the business judgment rule demands minimal interference from courts). 
 261. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 262. See cases cited supra note 261. 
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decision was otherwise not based on an informed process.263 Thus, liability 
attaches only if directors’ decisions are significantly uninformed or directors 
engage in conduct perceived to be egregious conduct or a severe abuse of 
discretion.264 As one former SEC official noted, “[T]he business judgment 
rule is essentially designed to immunize corporate business decisions from 
accountability through the judicial process.”265 That rule explains why 
independent directors’ behavior rarely results in liability. 
Perhaps more troubling, while independent directors’ primary role is 
oversight, the Delaware Supreme Court recently announced that proving 
liability based on an oversight failure is the most difficult action under which 
a director can be held liable.266 Courts distinguish between cases where 
directors make decisions, and hence their actions are covered by the 
business judgment rule, and those cases in which directors fail to act under 
circumstances where they have a monitoring responsibility.267 These latter 
cases implicate oversight liability. Establishing such liability requires 
demonstrating that directors “utterly failed” to implement any reporting 
system, information system, or controls; or “consciously failed” to monitor or 
oversee its operations.268 In other words, liability will be found only when 
directors consciously disregarded their responsibility by intentionally failing 
to act in the face of a known duty to act.269 Delaware courts acknowledge 
that the test for oversight liability is deliberately “quite high.”270 Because 
independent directors engage primarily in monitoring, they are most likely 
to be subject to actions alleging breaches of oversight. Thus, Professor 
Black’s study revealed that the vast majority of fiduciary-duty claims against 
 
 263. See cases cited supra note 261. As one court notes, Delaware courts give “great 
deference to the substance of the directors’ decision and will not invalidate the decision, will 
not examine its reasonableness, and ‘will not substitute [its] views for those of the board if the 
latter’s decision can be “attributed to any rational business purpose.”’” Paramount Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45 n.17 (Del. 1994) (quoting Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949).  
 264. See Paramount, 637 A.2d at 45.  
 265. See Borowski, supra note 8, at 468; see also Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1041 (noting 
that later drafts have retreated from emphasizing judicial review to the position held today); 
Black et al., supra note 239, at 1090 (“[E]stablishing even nominal liability against an outside 
director for a duty of care breach is exceedingly difficult.”). 
 266. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 372 (Del. 2006) (referring to the oversight action as 
“possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a 
judgment”). 
 267. See id. at 369. 
 268. See id. at 370. 
 269. See id. at 369; see also Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 933 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting 
that oversight liability requires a finding that actions amounted to a “knowing abdication of 
their directorial duties”); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (noting that 
the Caremark decision “premises liability on a showing that the directors were conscious of the 
fact that they were not doing their job”). 
 270. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 372; In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 
971 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
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independent directors involved oversight claims.271 The difficulty associated 
with proving such claims confirms the relatively low risk of liability facing 
independent directors. 
4. A Closer Look at the Connection Between Liability and 
Effective Monitoring 
This lack of liability potentially reduces the effectiveness of 
independent directors. Indeed, legal liability in the form of criminal and 
civil sanctions is aimed at ensuring an actor’s fidelity to her fiduciary 
obligations, particularly through deterrence. Thus, such liability is aimed at 
ensuring that independent directors perform their monitoring role with 
sufficient rigor by deterring suboptimal conduct.272 The lack of such 
liability, therefore, reduces that assurance. 
Some corporate scholars are unconcerned about the lack of liability 
imposed on independent directors because they believe such liability has no 
impact on their performance. Such scholars point to empirical evidence 
indicating that legal sanctions have very little deterrent value.273 They also 
pinpoint the various legal sanctions that existed before, but apparently failed 
to deter, the corporate scandals of 2002.274 In this regard, these scholars 
question the wisdom of relying on legal sanctions to constrain or deter 
independent director conduct and thus are unconcerned with the virtual 
absence of such sanctions. 
This lack of concern is misguided—there are studies revealing the 
importance of legal sanctions in curbing misconduct.275 Moreover, such 
 
 271. See Black et al., supra note 239, at 1060, 1074. 
 272. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1484 (noting that monetary liability fosters attention to 
the affairs of the corporation). 
 273. See John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate 
Deterrence, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 7, 29 (1991) (concluding that criminal sanctions failed to deter 
the conduct of nursing-home managers in Australia); Sally S. Simpson & Christopher S. Koper, 
Deterring Corporate Crime, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 347, 369 (1992) (finding little support for the 
proposition that deterrence theory applies to antitrust violators).  
 274. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in 
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 955 (2003) (questioning the ability of severe 
penalties to deter corporate misconduct); Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to 
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 34 (2002) (noting 
that instances of fraud suggest corporate officials’ “willing[ness] to proceed in the face” of 
liability, and hence it is unclear how more liability will produce additional constraints on 
behavior).  
 275. See Richard C. Hollinger & John P. Clark, Deterrence in the Workplace: Perceived Certainty, 
Perceived Severity, and Employee Theft, 62 SOC. FORCES 398, 414 (1983) (finding that increased 
certainty and severity deterred employee theft); Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, Tax Compliance 
and Perceptions of the Risks of Detection and Criminal Prosecution, 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 209, 237–38 
(1989) (finding that a greater risk of detection and prosecution deterred people from cheating 
on their taxes); Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: 
Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549, 579–80 (1996) 
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studies suggest that legal sanctions are generally ineffective in deterring 
improper conduct when there is decreased certainty regarding their 
implementation.276 That suggestion may explain why our current liability 
regime has failed to deter corporate misconduct. In other words, the 
relatively low risk of liability faced by independent directors may undermine 
the ability of such liability to deter or shape their behavior. In this regard, 
empirical evidence reveals that if sanctions are certain, they have a powerful 
impact on conduct.277 Therefore, there is support for the notion that such 
sanctions can constrain independent directors’ behavior if properly 
implemented. Such support refutes the notion that legal sanctions have no 
deterrent value, while suggesting that the current legal liability scheme fails 
to encourage optimal behavior on the part of independent directors. 
Other scholars insist that legal sanctions are unnecessary to curtail 
director misconduct or otherwise ensure that directors pay heed to their 
responsibilities because other mechanisms exist that ensure director 
compliance. As an initial matter, these scholars insist that reliance on legal 
sanctions could have decidedly negative consequences.278 Thus, such 
liability could reduce optimal decision making by making directors risk-
averse.279 Thus, such scholars contend that we should rely on other 
mechanisms, notably the capital markets and reputational sanctions.280 First, 
these scholars insist that capital markets adequately regulate director 
behavior, deterring directors from taking actions that would harm the 
corporation because those actions would have a negative impact on stock 
price.281 That impact jeopardizes both the corporation and independent 
directors. In this respect, the markets encourage directors to effectively 
monitor. However, widespread corporate scandals reflect examples of 
 
(concluding that threats of criminal and civil sanctions serve as an effective deterrent to 
corporate crime). But see Simpson & Koper, supra note 273, at 369. 
 276. See Klepper & Nagin, supra note 275, at 237–38; Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 
275, at 579–80; Simpson & Koper, supra note 273, at 366–67. 
 277. See Klepper & Nagin, supra note 275 (revealing the importance of certainty in 
deterrence); see also Hollinger & Clark, supra note 275, at 399 (concluding that perceived 
certainty and punishment impact behavior). 
 278. See David M. Phillips, Principles of Corporate Governance: A Critique of Part IV, 52 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 653, 673 (1984) (arguing that extra-legal incentives already regulate conduct, 
making legal regulation unnecessary and undesirable); Ribstein, supra note 274, 47–48 (noting 
a preference for market-based regulation over legal regulation because of the costs associated 
with the latter).  
 279. See Phillips, supra note 278, at 683–84; Ribstein, supra note 274, at 39. 
 280. See Phillips, supra note 278, at 681–82; Ribstein, supra note 274, at 21–22. 
 281. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1263 
(1982) (noting regulatory impact of markets); Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the 
Last Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1937–38 (2003) (noting that corporate officers 
and directors are constrained by various markets); Phillips, supra note 278, at 673–82 
(emphasizing the impact of the market on corporate behavior).  
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market failure.282 Liability regimes are necessary precisely because of the 
potential for such failure, encouraging managers to act faithfully when such 
failure occurs.283 Hence, it is inappropriate to believe that markets can fully 
shape director behavior. 
Second, scholars insist that reputational sanctions appropriately 
encourage independent directors’ fidelity to their monitoring duties. This 
rationale points out that independent directors are enmeshed in the 
business community. Their desire to protect their reputation in that 
community ensures their compliance with their responsibilities.284 Yet 
studies have found reputational sanctions to be ineffective in altering 
director behavior.285 Thus, it is not appropriate to place undue reliance on 
such sanctions. The fact that we do not impose significant liability on 
independent directors means that we are significantly dependent on 
reputational sanctions to encourage independent directors. As a result, we 
rely on an ineffective method for aligning their behavior with corporate 
interests. 
5. Concluding Thoughts on Liability 
Because independent directors rarely face liability for their actions, the 
focus on independent directors means that the corporate-monitoring system 
depends upon the least accountable actors in the corporate regime. While 
some contend that markets and reputational sanctions can ensure that 
independent directors are accountable for their actions (or lack thereof), 
this contention is flawed. Still others suggest that liability risks cannot 
encourage directors to adhere to their responsibilities, but studies contradict 
that suggestion. Hence, the failure to ensure that independent directors face 
some credible risk of liability means we may have no serious accountability 
process for those directors. This makes reliance on such directors 
particularly problematic. 
F. THE MIXED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
The empirical evidence on the benefits associated with director 
independence is mixed at best. First, the weight of the empirical evidence 
tilts against the proposition that independent directors enhance overall 
corporate performance. Some empirical studies support the notion that 
independent directors improve corporate performance.286 But many more 
contradict that notion, suggesting that there is no correlation between 
 
 282. See Ribstein, supra note 274, at 61. 
 283. See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1074. 
 284. See Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
959, 966–67 (1999). 
 285. See Fich & Shivdasani, supra note 115, at 309–10; Helland, supra note 115. 
 286. See Prentice & Spence, supra note 5, at 1866. 
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corporate performance and the percentage of independent directors on the 
board.287 Second, the overall evidence with respect to discrete tasks fails to 
demonstrate a strong correlation between independent directors and 
improved corporate performance in particular areas. Hence, while some 
studies find that independent directors perform better at particular tasks, 
such as firing a poorly performing CEO288 or detecting fraud,289 others 
refute those results.290 Moreover, studies indicate that independent 
directors are not more effective at discrete tasks such as monitoring 
companies in financial distress291 or curtailing CEO compensation.292 A 
similar pattern emerges with respect to the presence of such directors on 
particular committees. Thus, some studies reveal that greater independence 
on the audit committee improves financial reporting.293 By contrast, a study 
of nominating, audit, and compensation committees found little evidence 
that total independence on those committees positively impacted a 
company’s performance.294 Then too, no study exists supporting the 
proposition that better performance will emerge if boards are comprised of 
a supermajority of independent directors.295 
Taken together, the empirical evidence at least calls into question the 
contention that independent directors are more effective monitors than 
insiders. A 1999 article by Professors Bhagat and Black comprehensively 
surveyed the available empirical data on independent directors to determine 
whether the trend toward enhanced independence rested on “sound 
 
 287. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 921–22; Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, 
Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 33, 52 (2007) (“No pattern emerges to suggest that it makes any difference at all to 
shareholders’ financial return whether a board has a higher or lower percentage of 
independent directors.”); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & 
ECON. 275, 277 (1998).  
 288. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 440–
41 (1988). 
 289. See Uzun et al., supra note 123, at 38–39. 
 290. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 924–26; Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO 
Compensation and Turnover: The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 
936 (2003). One study found no correlation between board independence and the incidences 
of managerial engagement in illegal acts. See Idalene F. Kesner, Bart Victor & Bruce T. Lamont, 
Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 Companies, 29 
ACAD. MGMT. J. 789, 794–96 (1986). Another study found that independent directors may have 
acquiesced in options backdating. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 148, at 3. Other studies reveal 
that the presence of independent directors has no impact on the corporation’s ability to 
control financial fraud. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 235; Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, 
at 933. 
 291. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 932–33. 
 292. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 235. 
 293. See Prentice & Spence, supra note 5, at 1872–73. 
 294. See Klein, supra note 2877, at 283. 
 295. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 235; Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 922 (noting 
that the movement towards supermajority boards has “entirely outstripped research”). 
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empirical footing,” and concluded that it did not.296 When Professors 
Bhagat and Black performed a follow-up study in 2002, their conclusion 
remained unchanged.297 Moreover, the conclusion was consistent with their 
own study, which found that companies with more independent directors on 
their boards do not perform better than others.298 While other scholars 
disagree with respect to the weight that should be given to various studies, 
they nevertheless acknowledge that the empirical evidence on the ability of 
independent directors to sufficiently perform their monitoring functions is 
mixed, if not “weak at best.”299 
In fact, a few studies indicate that independent directors may perform 
worse than their inside counterparts.300 Those studies reveal that inside 
directors may outperform independent directors both with respect to overall 
corporate performance and with respect to certain discrete tasks. Thus, 
some studies found a negative correlation between the presence of 
independent directors and corporate performance.301 Others revealed that 
having inside directors on particular committees correlated with improved 
performance.302 Still others found a negative correlation between outside 
directors and fraud detection.303 These studies collectively suggest that 
inside directors may have a positive influence on corporate affairs in 
general, as well as within specific committees or otherwise with respect to 
areas of particular concern to the public. 
Taken as a whole, the empirical evidence does not convincingly prove 
that independent directors necessarily lead to more effective and efficient 
monitoring. That lack of proof is consistent with the hypothesis that such 
directors may be constrained in their ability to perform their functions with 
the requisite rigor. Moreover, it sets the stage for further exploration of an 
enhanced role for inside directors within the corporate arena. 
IV. THE UNEASY CASE FOR THE INSIDER DIRECTOR 
This Part demonstrates that inside directors can respond to some of the 
deficiencies of independent directors and thus can be valuable members of 
the board. This Part also grapples with some of the drawbacks associated 
 
 296. Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 921–22.  
 297. Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 233. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See Gordon, supra note 30, at 1500; see also Prentice & Spence, supra note 5, at 1864, 
1867. Prentice and Spence note that the evidence is “decidedly mixed,” and thus “one cannot 
claim the empirical evidence clearly indicates that more independent boards will produce 
better financial results.” Id. 
 300. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1530 (2005) (suggesting that the trend towards increased 
independence may lead to suboptimal results). 
 301. See Bhagat & Black , supra note 3, at 236–37.  
 302. See Klein, supra note 287, at 300. 
 303. See id. 
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with reliance on inside directors and considers ways in which those concerns 
can be resolved. 
A. THE CASE FOR THE INSIDE DIRECTOR 
1. A Director by Any Other Name . . . 
The fact that independent and inside directors are both constrained in 
their ability to be objective undermines the rationale for favoring one 
category of director over the other. To be sure, the distinguishing feature 
between an independent director and an inside director is that the inside 
director owes her job, and hence her livelihood, to the corporation and 
those in charge. As a result, we have presumed that such insiders would be 
incapable of being objective monitors. 
However, that presumption sweeps too broadly. Indeed, the selection 
bias currently endemic to independent directors means that such directors 
owe their positions to the corporation, its directors, and in some cases, its 
CEO. In this respect, independent directors depend upon the corporation 
and its board for their directorial positions and the fees that result from it. 
Such dependence increases the probability that they will feel beholden to 
the corporation and its directors in some of the same ways that insiders may 
feel beholden to the corporation. That dependence, coupled with the social 
ties and structural bias common among directors, significantly hinders 
independent directors’ ability to be impartial. From this perspective, 
although the nature and extent of the constraints faced by each type of 
director may be different, such constraints all have the effect of impeding 
directors’ impartiality. This blurs the distinction between independent and 
inside directors, while weakening the case for preferring independent 
directors over inside directors. The weakness of that case is confirmed by 
much of the empirical evidence suggesting that there may be no difference 
between the effectiveness of inside directors and independent directors.304 
Thus, the fact that independent directors and inside directors are subject to 
ties that compromise them in similar ways indicates that inside directors may 
perform no worse than independent directors with respect to monitoring 
the corporation. 
Then, too, it is possible that recent reforms have enhanced inside 
directors’ ability to be effective monitors. Indeed, much of the literature 
with respect to the ineffectiveness of inside directors presumes that such 
directors cannot be effective because of the CEO’s dominance.305 In other 
words, the fact that inside directors are subordinate to the CEO means that 
they will acquiesce in her policies or otherwise be disinclined to seriously 
 
 304. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 1, at 922. 
 305. See Rodrigues, supra note 7, at 456. 
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criticize those policies.306 To be sure, the evidence reveals that independent 
directors may face similar impediments with respect to the CEO.307 
However, recent reforms may have reduced the CEO’s influence in the 
boardroom. Thus, companies have been pressured to separate the CEO and 
board chair position.308 As a result, close to half of S&P 1500 companies 
have adopted such a board structure.309 Then, too, the overwhelming 
majority of corporations that combine the board chair and CEO positions 
have lead directors, whose role is to preside over discussions outside of the 
presence and influence of the CEO.310 These reforms seek to reduce the 
CEO’s influence in the boardroom. It is too soon to tell if they will have 
their desired result or if CEOs will continue to indirectly influence board 
discussions. However, these reforms may make it easier for other inside 
directors to engage in candid discussions, while undermining the extent to 
which such directors may feel forced to defer to the positions of the CEO. As 
a result, they increase the potential for insiders to be effective monitors. 
2. Inside Directors and Incentives 
Inside directors may be especially motivated to act in ways that advance 
corporate interests. Indeed, corporate scholars recognize that directors who 
are not incentivized cannot perform their oversight role effectively because 
they lack the motivation to engage in actions beneficial to the 
corporation.311 Independent directors’ independence from the corporation 
means that they have no direct tie to the corporation and thus may not have 
incentives to advance corporate and shareholder interests.312 Recognizing 
this problem, corporate-governance scholars have focused on methods for 
creating those incentives.313 The primary method of incentivizing 
independent directors has been to ensure that they own stock in the 
corporation on whose board they sit.314 A recent study revealed that some 
 
 306. See id. 
 307. See supra text accompanying note 182 (noting the problems with CEO capture). 
 308. See Olson & Adams, supra note 125, at 447 (discussing recommendations for American 
public corporations to consider separation of functions between the CEO and the board chair). 
 309. See RISKMETRICS GRP., BOARD PRACTICES: TRENDS IN BOARD STRUCTURE AT S&P 1,500 
COMPANIES 3 (2008), available at http://www.riskmetrics.com/sites/default/files/BP2009. 
pdf. 
 310. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 7 (noting that eighty-four percent of 
companies in which the CEO is also the chair has a lead director). 
 311. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 265 (pinpointing evidence supporting the premise 
that directors’ incentives impact firm performance). 
 312. See Cosenza, supra note 62, at 25 (noting the need for an incentive system for 
independent directors to align their interests with shareholders). 
 313. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 860; Cosenza, supra note 62, at 25; Joseph P. Farano, 
How Much Is Too Much? Director Equity Ownership and Its Role in the Independence Assessment, 38 
SETON HALL L. REV. 753, 769 (2008).  
 314. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 860; Cosenza, supra note 62, at 25; Farano, supra note 
313, at 769. 
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eighty percent of directors are required to own company stock.315 This 
ownership is designed to provide independent directors with some tangible 
connection to the corporation and its shareholders, thereby encouraging 
them to comply with their monitoring obligations. However, such ownership 
has not yielded its desired result, potentially undermining independent 
directors’ effectiveness.316 More importantly, creating such an incentive 
structure is unnecessary for inside directors. Inside directors have “their 
human capital, and often most of their financial capital, committed to their 
company.”317 Thus, unlike independent directors, who require artificial 
methods for incentivizing their commitment to the corporation, inside 
directors are extremely motivated to act in ways that benefit the corporation. 
Consequently, insiders’ lack of independence may be beneficial. 
To be sure, inside directors’ desire to enhance corporate welfare can 
have damaging consequences. This is because the human and financial 
capital they have invested in the corporation may cause them to overreach. 
Thus, the fact that inside directors may be especially incentivized proves too 
much, highlighting the fact that they are uniquely vulnerable to self-dealing 
or other forms of corporate malfeasance. However, that problem is certainly 
no longer unique to inside directors. Instead, while independent directors’ 
stock ownership increases their incentives to advance corporate interests, it 
also increases the likelihood that such directors will acquiesce or participate 
in misconduct that has the effect of enhancing stock price.318 From this 
perspective, any incentive structure creates a double-edged sword. 
Therefore, an appropriate balance must be found between incentives and 
restraints on those incentives. As Part IV.C discusses, reinvigorating external 
regulation may enable us to reap the benefits of inside directors’ greater 
motivation while minimizing the costs associated with that motivation, 
thereby avoiding a wholesale elimination of their role on the board. 
3. Bridging the Information and Knowledge Divide 
Inside directors can add value to the board because they are better 
informed and more knowledgeable than independent directors. Inside 
directors’ decisions are more likely to be informed because of their 
informational advantage over independent directors.319 Inside directors 
invest considerable time and resources into the corporation, which 
translates into superior knowledge about the company. This knowledge 
means that they are likely to make better decisions even as compared to an 
 
 315. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 28. 
 316. See supra text accompanying note 314 (explaining mixed incentives created by stock 
ownership). 
 317. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 264. 
 318. See Bebchuk, supra note 169, at 851; Farano, supra note 313, at 770. 
 319. See Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 1056. 
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independent director who receives similar information because inside 
directors can put the information in a broader, more nuanced context.320 In 
addition, inside directors may be better equipped to monitor than 
independent directors because they have sufficient information and 
knowledge to better determine if information has been corrupted or 
misconduct has occurred. 
Some may contend that the insiders’ informational advantage and 
expertise may be harnessed by simply inviting them to present to the board. 
However, this may prove ineffective for several reasons. First, as noted above, 
inside directors may add value as monitors because they may have a better 
perspective and understanding of corporate affairs. This means that insiders 
must participate in the oversight function and thus be members of the 
board. Second, independent directors may not be able to sufficiently absorb 
the information being presented to them.321 Along these lines, Professors 
Gorga and Halberstam note that decentralized corporations make 
knowledge transfer and coordination especially difficult.322 This difficulty 
hampers the ability of corporations to adequately convey corporate 
information to directors who lack knowledge about the company, while 
hampering such directors’ ability to sufficiently understand that 
information.323 Bringing more insiders on the board alleviates this problem 
because they can more readily grasp and process information about the 
company.324 Third, inside directors may add more value when they actively 
participate in board discussions and thus play an active role in shaping 
board decisions. Indeed, insiders’ interactions with other directors inevitably 
will be different and more robust if they are members of the board rather 
than invited guests (who can be uninvited).325 Thus, as board members, 
insiders will have a distinctly different and more valuable role than invited 
guests who merely impart information. 
Empirical evidence appears to support the theory that inside directors 
make valuable contributions to the board.326 Studies also confirm that 
having board members with intimate knowledge of the business may 
generate better informed decision making.327 
 
 320. See id. 
 321. See Gorga & Halberstam, supra note 221, at 1134–35, 1163 (discussing how efforts to 
reduce agency costs by employing knowledge substitutes are misguided).  
 322. See id. at 1132, 1163. 
 323. See id. 
 324. See id. at 1132. 
 325. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 264. 
 326. See Klein, supra note 287, at 277 (indicating that inside directors outperform 
independent directors in certain areas). 
 327. See Olson & Adams, supra note 125, at 446–47; Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great 
Boards Great, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2002, at 106. 
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To be sure, the concern is not that inside directors are inferior to 
independent directors with respect to their informational and knowledge 
advantage, but rather that inside directors will use that advantage to corrupt 
the information. The challenge is to generate methods of reducing or 
minimizing that possibility. Instead, current governance trends have simply 
reduced or minimized the role of inside directors, thereby eliminating any 
advantages that those directors confer on the board. That trend needs to be 
reconsidered. 
4. Board Diversity and the Inside Director 
Increasing the presence of inside directors on the board also may 
enable corporations to increase board diversity—the number of women and 
people of color on the board. While the number of women and directors of 
color has grown over the past thirty years,328 these groups nevertheless still 
appear to be underrepresented in the boardroom. In 2007, 85% of Fortune 
1000 companies had at least one woman on their boards, while 78% of such 
companies had at least one person of color on their boards.329 Of course, 
this means that 15% of companies continue to have an all-male board and 
more than 20% of companies have an all-white board. In addition, the 
overall percentage of board seats held by diverse groups is still relatively 
small. For example, women hold roughly 16% of board seats despite 
comprising 46% of the U.S. labor force and 50% of all managerial and 
professional positions.330 People of color hold less than 9% of available 
board seats331 while holding approximately 30% of the labor force and some 
21% of all management, professional, and related jobs.332 Hence, 
organizations have expressed concern with the current level of diversity in 
the boardroom.333 
Board diversity has several advantages. Given the number of women and 
people of color in the population and workforce,334 increasing board 
 
 328. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 6–7. In 1973, only 11% of companies had 
women on their boards, while only 9% of companies had a person of color on their boards.  
 329. THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 6–7. 
 330. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR 
FORCE: A DATABOOK 28 tbl.11 (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2005. 
pdf. 
 331. See Carol Hymowitz, Corporate Boards Lack Gender, Racial Equality, WALL ST. J., July 7, 
2003. 
 332. See infra note 335; see also OFFICE OF EMP’T AND UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS, U.S. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2009, at 
14 tbl.6 (2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsrace2009.pdf (listing household data 
annual averages).  
 333. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 6. 
 334. See POPULATION INFO. STAFF, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR STATES 
BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN (1999), available at http://www.census.gov/population/ 
estimates/state/srh/srh99.txt (indicating that people of color comprised about 30% of the 
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diversity may be important not only because it ensures that boards reflect 
the larger community, but also because it reflects the corporation’s 
commitment to eradicating subtle biases that may prevent women and 
people of color from achieving success at the highest levels. Such diversity 
also may impact the corporate bottom line. Indeed, several scholars recently 
have argued that corporations should encourage board diversity because 
such diversity not only increases the overall effectiveness of the board, but 
also enhances a corporation’s profitability.335 In fact, social-science research 
suggests that board homogeneity impedes directors from considering 
alternative views and engaging in the critical thinking necessary to make 
informed decisions or serve as active monitors.336 Board diversity may 
counteract this problem, thereby ensuring that directors more appropriately 
perform their managerial and monitoring duties. Other scholars have 
asserted that board diversity can have a positive impact on the corporation’s 
bottom line by improving a corporation’s ability to interact with its 
increasingly diverse employees, customers, and clients.337 To be sure, some 
may have overstated the extent to which board diversity can be economically 
beneficial to the corporation.338 However, such diversity nevertheless may 
translate into improved corporate performance under the right 
circumstances. Some tentative empirical support exists for this assertion.339 
Moreover, many corporations have embraced such a rationale for board 
 
population in 2000); Jon Meacham, The New Face of Race, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18, 2000, at 40 
(estimating that people of color will comprise more than half of the U.S. population by 2050). 
 335. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas, The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of 
Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1403–04 (2002); O’Connor, supra note 120, at 1306–08 (stating 
that diversity may enhance board effectiveness); Steven A. Ramirez, A Flaw in the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Reform: Can Diversity in the Boardroom Quell Corporate Corruption?, 77 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 837, 853 
(2003) [hereinafter Ramirez, A Flaw]; Steven A. Ramirez, Diversity and the Boardroom, 6 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 85, 90–109 (2000) [hereinafter Ramirez, Boardroom Diversity] (arguing that 
diversity can improve American businesses generally, and boards of directors in particular); 
Janis Sarra, The Gender Implications of Corporate Governance Change, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 
457, 494 (2002) (stating that diversity can enhance corporate governance). For a general 
discussion on the impact of group homogeneity, see Taylor H. Cox et al., Effects of Ethnic Group 
Cultural Differences on Cooperative and Competitive Behavior on a Group Task, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 827, 
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Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193, 202–03 (1984); Susan E. Jackson, 
Consequences of Group Composition for the Interpersonal Dynamics of Strategic Issue Processing, 8 
ADVANCES STRATEGIC MGMT. 345, 354 (1992). 
 336. See O’Connor, supra note 120, at 1306. 
 337. See Dallas, supra note 335; Ramirez, A Flaw, supra note 335; Ramirez, Boardroom 
Diversity, supra note 335. 
 338. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Bottom Line on Board Diversity: A Cost Benefit Analysis of the 
Business Rationales for Diversity on Corporate Boards, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 795, 811–38. 
 339. See CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CONNECTING CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND GENDER 
DIVERSITY 1–2 (2004), available at http://www.catalyst.org/publication/82/the-bottom-line-
connecting-corporate-performance-and-gender-diversity; David A. Carter et al., Corporate 
Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 44–51 (2003), (finding a positive 
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diversity.340 As a result, corporations have at least professed a commitment 
to enhancing board diversity. 
Many presumed that the focus on independent directors would increase 
board diversity,341 but that presumption has proven to be inaccurate. 
Indeed, a recent Korn/Ferry Study reveals that the number of women and 
people of color on corporate boards essentially has remained static over the 
last several years, roughly correlating to the enactment of SOX.342 The study 
indicates that such groups’ board representation may have reached a 
plateau.343 
While federal reforms may not have caused this plateau, their focus on 
director independence may have exacerbated efforts to increase diversity. 
One oft-cited rationale for the relatively low percentage of diverse board 
members is the “pool problem”—the notion that there are not enough 
qualified candidates from which to choose.344 A focus on independent 
directors may exacerbate the pool problem. When seeking an independent 
director, corporations often focus on people who are CEOs or former 
CEOs.345 Given the relatively small number of women and people of color 
among that population, it is little wonder that boards have found it difficult 
to secure diverse directors. Indeed, to overcome this problem, boards tend 
to seek out the same few women and people of color to serve as directors.346 
Thus, one Forbes survey revealed that while many other directors had 
reduced their board seats over the last few years, most women and people of 
color had either retained the number of board seats they held or increased 
them.347 In this regard, the focus on independence may be 
counterproductive because it has encouraged diverse directors to 
overextend themselves, and that overextension appears to undermine a 
director’s effectiveness. 
A practical solution to this problem could be to encourage boards to 
expand their criteria to include people with backgrounds beyond chief 
 
 340. See THE KORN/FERRY INST., supra note 4, at 7 (“With the U.S. Census Bureau 
projecting that minorities will represent more than half of the U.S. population by 2050, it 
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 341. See Fairfax, supra note 338, at 804–07. 
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 343. See id. at 6. 
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 345. See id. at 18. 
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A3 - FAIRFAX.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2010  2:13 PM 
184 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:127 
executive experience. While this may be an appropriate strategy, it may have 
negative implications for women and people of color. First, it may 
encourage corporations to recruit directors without sufficient business 
expertise, thereby putting diverse directors at an informational 
disadvantage. Second, studies reveal that directors may give less credence to 
the opinions of those that are perceived to have limited business 
expertise.348 Consequently, expanding the criteria could lead to 
marginalization of diverse directors because it increases the potential that 
such directors may not command the same level of respect as others in the 
boardroom. 
Alternatively, if corporations recruit more inside directors, women and 
people of color should benefit from their recruitment efforts. Indeed, while 
the number of people on corporate boards is relatively small, they are better 
represented in managerial positions. For example, studies indicate that 
there are a considerable number of women managers below the top level.349 
While such managers may not be perceived to have the expertise to serve on 
other boards, they have the firm-specific knowledge that could make them 
valuable additions to their own board. In this regard, corporations could 
secure board members from that population without significant difficulties. 
In so doing, corporations can ensure that diverse directors are not at an 
informational disadvantage. This strategy has the added benefit of giving 
diverse directors quality board experience so that they may knowledgeably 
serve as directors at other corporations, thereby increasing the pool of 
qualified candidates. In this respect, shifting the focus to inside directors 
enhances opportunities to increase the number of diverse directors on the 
board and harness any benefits that result from their membership. 
Focusing on inside directors also may reduce some of the drawbacks 
associated with board diversity. First, many proponents of diversity insist that 
corporations and their boards cannot reap the benefits of diversity unless 
boards have a significant number or “critical mass” of diverse directors.350 
This is because without such a critical mass, diverse directors may be less 
likely to express divergent views, undermining their ability to facilitate the 
consideration of broader perspectives on the board.351 Board studies reveal 
that most corporations do not have a critical mass of diverse directors.352 
 
 348. See Lin, supra note 60, at 951. 
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 350. See O’Connor, supra note 120, at 1309. 
 351. See id. at 1310. 
 352. See Carter et al., supra note 339, at 11.  
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Instead, many only have one or two such directors.353 Thus, the current 
focus on independent directors has not translated into the development of a 
critical mass. By contrast, focusing on the more robust pool of potential 
inside candidates could enable corporations to develop such a critical mass. 
Second, while some studies indicate that diversifying the board can 
prove beneficial, they also indicate that such diversity could involve costs. 
Thus, research indicates that greater diversity could reduce collegiality in 
the boardroom, thereby reducing productivity.354 As current members of 
the corporation whose managerial positions suggest that they have been 
successful in the corporation, inside directors may be better equipped to 
interact with directors at their company, decreasing the potential for 
conflicts or divisiveness that could reduce a board’s productivity. Professors 
Carbado and Gulati have noted that the corporation’s promotion system 
typically screens out people of color who may challenge the status quo and 
are not palatable.355 However, the possibility that promoting from within 
could lead to diverse directors who are less inclined to be critical can be 
reduced if there is a critical mass of such directors.356 Hence, securing a 
diverse director from inside the corporation may enable corporations to 
harness the benefits of diversity while avoiding some of its pitfalls. 
Recognizing that independent directors, like inside directors, may be 
constrained in their ability to be effective monitors opens the door for a 
critical discussion of the potential benefits associated with inside directors. 
As Subpart A reveals, inside directors may have better incentives than their 
outside counterparts and may be better equipped than outside directors to 
bridge the information and knowledge divide. Recruiting inside directors 
has the added advantage of potentially increasing board diversity. In these 
ways, the inside director may have a positive impact in the corporate 
boardroom and beyond. Of course, that impact must be balanced against 
any potential negative repercussions that stem from an increased focus on 
inside directors. Subpart B discusses those repercussions. 
B. THE UNEASE 
1. Self-Dealing Reconsidered 
The primary concern with insiders as monitors centers around the 
possibility that they will use their inside advantage to enrich themselves, and 
 
 353. See id. 
 354. See TAYLOR COX JR. & CAROL SMOLINSKI, MANAGING DIVERSITY AND GLASS CEILING 
INITIATIVES AS NATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr. 
cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1119&context=key_workplace; Dallas, supra note 335, 
at 1393; Jackson, supra note 335, at 361–62. 
 355. See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of Critical Race Theory, 112 
YALE L.J. 1757, 1798–802 (2003) (book review).  
 356. See id. 
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thereby engage in self-dealing transactions. As indicated in previous 
sections, this concern creates a corporate-governance challenge. Our 
response to this concern has been to prefer independent directors over 
inside directors. Even those skeptical of the value of independent directors 
maintain that they have a role to play in overseeing conflict-of-interest 
transactions.357 
However, that response is problematic for at least two reasons. First, 
independent directors are not necessarily effective at monitoring conflicts of 
interest. Instead, as discussed above, structural and other biases impede 
their objectivity and ability to critically examine such transactions. As a 
result, evidence confirms their tendency to acquiesce in managerial self-
dealing. Second, inside directors add value to the corporation, and hence 
substantially reducing their role on the board seems to sweep too broadly. 
The corporate-governance solution to the self-dealing problem should not 
be a continued reliance on this flawed response. Instead, we should seek an 
alternate response to the challenge. 
One potential response is to reinvigorate the role of external 
regulations, at least with respect to conflicts of interest and other high-risk 
transactions. As a general matter, the rationale for deference to directors’ 
business judgment is not altogether convincing. While judges are not 
businesspeople, they nevertheless intervene in a host of other areas where 
they lack expertise.358 This rationale is particularly troubling in the context 
of self-dealing transactions. Courts clearly recognize the risk associated with 
those transactions but defer to independent directors based on the 
presumption that such directors are not also biased in ways that impede 
their objectivity. Given the flaws with that presumption, their deference in 
the context of these transactions is inappropriate. Consequently, courts 
should embrace an approach of more rigorous review for those transactions. 
Indeed, the preference in favor of independent directors may be more 
troubling in the context of self-dealing transactions because it ensures that 
most high-risk transactions will continue to receive little or no substantive 
review from courts. To this end, insiders’ presence on boards may serve an 
important signaling function, thereby increasing the potential for such 
review. This is because independent directors ensure deference from the 
courts, while inside directors prompt more exacting review. Thus, inside 
directors’ presence may be necessary to ensure that courts appreciate the 
importance of analyzing these transactions more thoroughly. 
2. Financial Fraud 
Some scholars contend that when you disaggregate the studies related 
to independent directors, it reveals strong support for the proposition that 
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A3 - FAIRFAX.DOC 11/8/2010  2:13 PM 
2010] THE UNEASY CASE FOR THE INSIDE DIRECTOR 187 
independent directors do a better job of detecting and preventing fraud, 
particularly financial fraud.359 Indeed, several studies find a negative 
correlation between financial-reporting fraud and the presence of 
independent directors.360 In particular, recent studies show that director 
independence on the audit committee correlates with improved financial 
reporting and fewer earnings restatements.361 
These studies may merit particular attention because fashioning a 
mechanism to better detect financial fraud may have been the primary 
purpose behind federal reforms.362 In other words, those reforms grew out 
of governance scandals involving financial fraud and hence were aimed at 
providing effective mechanisms for preventing and detecting such fraud in 
the future. Therefore, studies focused on financial fraud may be the most 
relevant measure of independent directors’ value. To the extent such studies 
reveal that the presence of independent directors positively correlates with 
fewer incidences of fraud, they support the broader trend in favor of such 
directors and away from inside directors. 
However, even disaggregated, the evidence with respect to financial 
fraud remains mixed. Hence, some studies find no correlation between 
director independence and the detection of financial fraud.363 Others find a 
positive correlation between the two, indicating that in some cases, 
independent directors may increase the potential for fraud.364 Still others 
indicate that independent directors may have acquiesced in, and benefited 
from, such fraud.365 
Moreover, the correlation between director independence and 
enhanced fraud detection may be explained by factors unconnected to a 
director’s status as independent. First, it could be that the empirical results 
reflect the impact of enhanced rules surrounding auditors, rather than the 
effect of director independence. Companies with independent audit 
committees and a majority of independent directors also tend to be 
companies that must comply with SOX’s requirements related to auditor 
 
 359. See Prentice & Spence, supra note 5, at 1868. 
 360. See MARK S. BEASLEY ET AL., COMM. OF SPONSORING ORGS. OF THE TREADWAY COMM’N, 
FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING: 1987–1997: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. PUBLIC COMPANIES 4 
(1999), available at http://www.coso.org/publications/FFR_1987_1997.pdf (finding that 
companies with more inside directors are more likely to be victims of financial fraud); Uzun et 
al., supra note 123, at 33–39. 
 361. See Prentice & Spence, supra note 5, at 1872–77. 
 362. See id. at 1868. 
 363. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 235; Kesner, Victor & Lamont, supra note 290, at 
789. 
 364. See Henry L. Tosi et al., Why Outsiders on Boards Can’t Solve the Corporate Governance 
Problem, 32 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 180 (2003). 
 365. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 148, at 1; Steve Stecklow, Outside Directors’ Options Role Is 
Cited in Backdating Study, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2006, at B3. 
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independence.366 Given that some of these studies regarding fraud were 
conducted post-SOX, the increased accountability and liability of such 
auditors may explain the decreased incidences of fraud. 
Second, the empirical results could reflect the effectiveness of the 
additional requirements imposed on audit committee members. In fact, the 
strongest and most robust evidence indicating that directors have a positive 
impact on reducing fraud has emerged in the context of such directors’ role 
on the audit committee.367 Thus, as opposed to the generally mixed 
empirical results in other areas, the evidence concerning the impact of audit 
committee independence appears more clear-cut.368 However, that evidence 
may reflect the impact of other factors. In addition to independence, 
members of the audit committee also must have financial expertise.369 While 
SOX requires that only one director on the audit committee have financial 
expertise, listing agencies require all directors to have financial acumen.370 
In this respect, directors’ enhanced expertise, rather than their 
independence, may account for their enhanced ability to detect fraud. 
Alternatively, the evidence may reveal the importance of independence 
coupled with expertise. In this respect, directors on the audit committee 
may be uniquely positioned to overcome the knowledge deficit. This is not 
only because the responsibilities associated with the audit committee make it 
the most time-intensive committee on which to serve, but also because 
knowledge of financial and accounting issues requires specialized expertise. 
That expertise enhances directors’ ability to understand and process the 
information provided to them. This suggests that the benefits of 
independence may be unique to the audit committee not only because the 
reforms ensure the necessary expertise that directors need, but also because 
that expertise overcomes the traditional limitations on directors’ 
effectiveness. 
Indeed, the evidence about independent directors’ impact on fraud 
detection does not negate other evidence suggesting that independent 
directors may be ineffective in enhancing overall corporate performance 
and in performing other discrete tasks. Given that independent directors 
bear responsibility for performing more than one task, it may be 
 
 366. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(and It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 942–47 (2003). 
 367. See Prentice & Spence, supra note 5, at 1872–75. 
 368. See id. at 1875. 
 369. Section 407 of SOX required the SEC to promulgate rules that require issuers to 
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 370. See NYSE Amex, supra note 39, § 121; NYSE, supra note 17, § 303; NASDAQ, supra note 
17, at r. 4200(a)(15).  
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inappropriate to use evidence related to a single task to support the 
preference in favor of director independence more broadly. 
3. Breaking the Chain of Command 
Another concern associated with inside directors is the potential that 
such directors, particularly those subordinate to other directors with whom 
they may serve, may feel beholden to their superiors in a way that 
undermines their ability to be objective. Some subordinate insiders may fear 
retaliation if they criticize or otherwise contradict their superiors. Others 
may view their service as an opportunity to curry favor with their 
subordinates and hence may simply rubber-stamp their actions. In this 
regard, inside directors who owe their livelihood to other directors may not 
be in the best position to serve as independent monitors. In fact, when asked 
to consider this issue, courts simply assume without discussion that 
subordinate directors are incapable of being considered independent for 
purposes of actions involving their superiors.371 Any reform that embraces 
inside directors must be mindful of this potential phenomenon. 
However, there may be ways in which this phenomenon can be 
mitigated. First, it may be prudent to ensure that inside directors have 
similar levels of seniority. Second, we should avoid having inside directors 
serving together when they are in the same chain of command, that is, when 
one insider is a direct subordinate of the other. Third, given the CEO’s 
dominance over other employees, any increase in the role of inside directors 
likely must include decreases in the role of the CEO. Evidence reveals that 
CEOs remain a forceful presence on the board. Indeed, not only is the CEO 
often the board chair, but the CEO is often the only inside director.372 
However, shareholder activists have been advocating for corporations to 
separate the role of board chair and CEO, and the number of companies 
who have separated such roles is rising.373 Then too, in companies where 
such roles are not separated, there is an increased reliance on lead or 
presiding directors who conduct meetings without the CEO being 
present.374 An increased reliance on lead directors may alleviate some of the 
concerns associated with subordinate insiders because it enables those 
insiders to engage in decision making outside of the CEO’s presence, 
thereby increasing the potential that such subordinates may feel 
comfortable exercising their independent judgment. 
 
 371. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 
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4. The Reality of Perception 
Even if inside directors add value to the board, the prevailing 
perception that independent directors are better equipped to monitor 
corporate affairs cannot be ignored. Indeed, businesses, legislators, and the 
public alike have embraced the norm in favor of director independence.375 
Moreover, this embrace may have an impact on firm value. Studies find that 
stock prices increase when a company appoints an independent director.376 
In this regard, the ship in favor of director independence appears to have 
sailed, and it may be counterproductive to focus on reforms aimed at 
increasing the presence of inside directors on the board. 
However, notwithstanding the difficulties with such a campaign, it is 
important to support the role that inside directors can play on the board, 
particularly when weighed against the drawbacks of independent directors. 
Such support could help alter the perception about the drawbacks of inside 
directors. 
C. THE OPTIMAL MIX AND EXTERNAL REGULATION 
Inside directors add value in terms of enhanced information, 
knowledge, and resources. Focusing on such directors also could enable 
corporations to better diversify their boards and harness the benefits of such 
diversity in the boardroom and corporation. Insiders have incentives to pay 
heed to corporate performance. 
Concerns about inside directors’ effectiveness and impartiality can be 
allayed, even if only in part, by the evidence related to independent 
directors’ effectiveness. That evidence indicates that such directors are 
limited in their ability to be impartial and thus perform their monitoring 
role with sufficient rigor, and that those limitations may be difficult to 
overcome—at least in this current environment. In many ways, therefore, 
independent directors may be as conflicted as inside directors, undermining 
the rationale for favoring such directors over inside directors. In this regard, 
the biases that plague inside directors should not translate into a categorical 
exclusion of those directors on the board, especially given the advantages 
inside directors can bring to the boardroom. 
Nevertheless, there is reason to be uneasy about increasing the number 
of inside directors on the corporate board. This unease stems not only from 
the prospects of adopting a strategy that runs counter to the overwhelming 
corporate-governance trend, but also from the more robust evidence 
concerning independent directors’ impact on fraud detection, particularly 
with respect to the audit committee. Moreover, focusing on inside directors 
reopens the issue of oversight for self-dealing transactions. As a 
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consequence, we may be more comfortable with seeking an optimal mix of 
inside and independent directors. This is because while we may have 
reservations about embracing boards dominated by insiders, we also should 
be uneasy with completely eradicating such directors from the boardroom. 
Importantly, some of our concerns may be alleviated by reinvigorating 
the role of external regulation, particularly with respect to judicial oversight 
of high-risk transactions. Such oversight ensures that transactions with the 
most risk of managerial self-dealing are reviewed by those more impartial 
than either independent or inside directors. Such oversight not only 
increases the opportunities to hold corporate actors accountable, but also 
increases the potential that the legal regime can have a deterrent effect on 
board behavior. 
In fact, imposing liability on inside directors may be a more realistic 
solution. As compared to independent directors, inside directors are more 
likely to face liability for overreaching and thus breaching their fiduciary 
obligations.377 Regulators and judges appear to be more comfortable with 
holding inside directors accountable, possibly because of their increased 
time commitment and increased knowledge about corporate affairs. Because 
the legal regime is more likely to hold inside directors accountable for their 
misbehavior, it provides at least one important check on their potential to 
overreach. Such a check does not exist for independent directors. The 
availability of such sanctions may provide better assurance that we can 
achieve an optimal balance between incentives and accountability, especially 
when compared to independent directors. Indeed, courts’ greater 
willingness to impose sanctions on inside directors may increase the 
likelihood that such sanctions can deter conduct because it increases the 
certainty of those sanctions. Such an increase in certainty, in turn, may 
reduce inside directors’ willingness to be complicit in corporate misconduct 
by altering their individual risk assessment. In this respect, even if legal 
sanctions have an impact only at the margins, the fact that inside directors 
are more likely to be subject to such sanctions may provide support for 
relying on inside directors. 
To be sure, external regulation is not a panacea. First, too much 
regulation can produce suboptimal results by deterring otherwise beneficial 
conduct. However, in light of the historical reluctance to impose liability on 
white-collar criminals, it is not clear that an increase in this area would be 
 
 377. See Sale, supra note 13, at 1379; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 254. As compared to 
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254. Moreover, in the past few years, inside directors have been subjected to criminal 
prosecutions and convictions, while independent directors have managed to avoid such 
prosecutions and convictions. See id. 
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unwarranted. Second, our governance system also should focus on 
incentives because rewards can and do ensure that corporate actors conform 
their behavior to their fiduciary obligations.378 In fashioning such incentives, 
attention should focus on enhancing whistleblower protections. Those 
protections recognize that insiders are the most likely to detect and prevent 
fraud, but that they require incentives because whistle-blowing can have 
negative consequences—most notably job loss.379 By enhancing the 
protections afforded to whistleblowers, we may minimize those 
consequences, thereby encouraging inside directors to be effective monitors. 
Although SOX incorporates some protection for whistleblowers,380 recent 
studies reveal that those protections may be insufficient and thus require 
enhancement.381 
Third, some may contend that external regulation in the form of 
liability is not likely to have an impact on inside directors for at least two 
reasons. The first is that such legal penalties exist, but they have failed to 
deter misconduct by inside directors. This failure is underscored by the fact 
that the legal regime is more likely to penalize such directors for their 
behavior, increasing the certainty and potential deterrent value of those 
penalties. However, that regime also enables independent directors to shield 
inside directors from the impact of their conduct, dramatically reducing 
inside directors’ risk of liability.382 Consequently, the presence of 
independent directors may have decreased the deterrent effect of legal 
liability for inside directors. Appropriately reinvigorating external regulation 
removes that shield, increasing the certainty of liability and thereby 
increasing the chances that such liability will have a meaningful impact on 
inside directors’ behavior. 
The second reason for skepticism regarding the impact of external 
regulation is that inside directors may be especially risk-averse, such that 
their desire to protect their jobs may cause them to acquiesce or even 
participate in misconduct. Of course, this is likely to occur regardless of 
whether or not independent directors have a role in monitoring, and it is 
not clear that such directors would have the information and expertise to 
detect such actions. In this regard, we must depend upon a combination of 
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rewards and appropriate sanctions, which may alter inside directors’ risk 
calculus. Even if this alteration occurs only at the margins, it may be more 
reliable than depending on independent directors—who are neither 
appropriately incentivized nor particularly accountable—to weed out 
wrongdoing.383 
V. CONCLUSION 
Currently, inside directors play a relatively minor role on the corporate 
board. The consensus view is that independent directors are better 
equipped to monitor the corporation to prevent corporate misconduct and 
enhance corporate performance. This view rests primarily on the contention 
that such directors’ independence from the corporation enables them to 
impartially—but effectively—oversee the corporation and its officers. By 
contrast, inside directors’ status as insiders prevents them from performing 
such a role and therefore justifies their near exclusion from the corporate 
boardroom. 
This Article demonstrates that our understanding of both independent 
directors and inside directors is flawed and therefore makes the case for 
increased reliance on inside directors. That case rests not only on the fact 
that independent directors face significant hurdles that may not be easily 
overcome, but also on the fact that reliance on independent directors has 
been inappropriately used to substitute for rigorous external regulation. 
The insights of this Article clearly have implications for corporate 
governance. First, they demonstrate that independence is not an inherent 
value and thus should not drive the debate about the appropriate model for 
board oversight. Second, the Article highlights the importance of external 
regulation. In fact, our fears that such regulation could discourage directors 
from seeking board seats or otherwise stifle appropriate risk-taking have 
blinded us to the important role that regulation plays in ensuring an 
effective accountability system. Moreover, our over-reliance on director 
independence has lulled us into accepting a governance system with very 
little external oversight. To be sure, we may have reservations about the case 
for the inside director. However, critically examining the inside directors’ 
role on the board may prompt us to have a broader and more realistic 
conversation about directors, corporate boards, and the development of 
more appropriate structures for enhancing corporate monitoring. 
 
 
 383. See Bhagat & Black, supra note 3, at 265 (“A priori, it is not obvious that independence 
(without knowledge or incentives) leads to better director performance than knowledge and 
strong incentives (without independence).”).  
